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In 2014, a Defense Science Board Task Force was convened in order to assess 
and explore new technologies that would aid in nuclear proliferation monitoring. One of 
their recommendations was for the director of National Intelligence to explore ways that 
crowdsourced geospatial imagery technologies could aid existing governmental efforts. 
Our research builds directly on this recommendation and provides feedback on some of 
the most successful examples of crowdsourced geospatial data (CGD).   
As of 2016, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has assumed the new role of 
becoming the primary U.S. agency responsible for counter-proliferation. Historically, this 
institution has always been reliant upon other organizations for the execution of its 
myriad of mission sets. SOCOM’s unique ability to build relationships makes it 
particularly suited to the task of harnessing CGD technologies and employing them in the 
capacity that our research recommends. Furthermore, CGD is a low cost, high impact tool 
that is already being employed by commercial companies and non-profit groups around 
the world. By employing CGD, a wider whole-of-government effort can be created that 
provides a long term, cohesive engagement plan for facilitating a multi-faceted nuclear 
proliferation monitoring process. 
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“Determining where we are, necessarily requires familiarity, first with where we have 
been.”  
— Henry D. Sokolski,  
Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future 
 
A. THE PROBLEM 
The frequency of cyber-attacks over the last decade should indicate to U.S. 
policymakers and military planners that the cyber domain poses a credible risk to the U.S. 
Homeland and its citizens. The overall security posture of the United States in the future 
will depend heavily on its ability to effectively merge new realities with innovative 
policies that are aligned against current, and near future threat(s). The cyber domain can 
be manipulated in numerous ways, but perhaps the most alarming aspect of the associated 
risks are the opportunities this domain presents to facilitating the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). Barriers to entry for rogue and non-state actors into the 
realm of strategic weaponry are falling rapidly; as disruptive technology offers nefarious 
actors new opportunities for undermining the security of the U.S. Homeland with the 
ultimate possibility of a nuclear 9/11.   
Five of the nine states that are in possession of nuclear weapons attained them 
prior to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. The fact that nuclear technology has 
spread since the inception of NPT speaks to the persistent nature of nuclear black 
markets.1 As a result of the nuclear proliferation network that Abdul Qadeer Khan 
created, state and non-state actors’ acquisition of nuclear weapons are limited only by 
                                                 
1 “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” taken from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency IAEA. Accessed May 24, 2016. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/
infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf. 
 2 
financial resources, technical skills and desire.2 Despite A.Q. Khan’s eventual 
apprehension, he left behind easily accessible, comprehensive nuclear knowledge that 
presents a persistent and challenging threat U.S. National Security.3  The post-Khan era 
has ushered in numerous factors that have led to a renewed level of scrutiny within the 
counter-proliferation arena. These factors are: 
– Higher yields, smaller warheads, and the increased precision of modern 
weaponry.  
– Pervasive access to nuclear knowledge; including numerous open source 
materials, on-line resources; social media platforms; and imagery mediums 
that provide an unprecedented level of accuracy in nuclear technology.4 
– Increased cooperation amongst proliferation networks and nations.5  
– Actual and threatened acquisition of nuclear weapons by malignant state and 
non-state actors that show little regard for treaties and international 
agreements.6  
                                                 
2 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (NewYork: 
Free Press, 2010); Joe Vaccarello, “U.N. Report Alleges North Korea Exported NuclearTechnology,” CNN 
News, accessed November 12, 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/11/un.north.korea/
index.html?eref=mrss_igoogle_cnn. 
Before his capture, A.Q. Khan served as the pioneer for economizing proliferation, establishing a one 
stop shop and central hub for nuclear parts, knowledge and components. He made nuclear technology (that 
was exclusive to five countries that maintained the knowledge) more available to any entity that possessed 
the means to pay for the materials. 
3 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall 
of the A. Q. Khan Network (New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009): 242–243. 
4 Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics. Washington, D.C., January 2014, 1; Bruno Gruselle, “Proliferation Networks 
and Financing” (Technical Report, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris, March 3, 2007, 22; 
David Albright, Peddling Peril:  How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York Free 
Press, 2010), 244–246. 
5 Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” 1; David Albright, Peddling Peril:  How the Secret Nuclear 
Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York Free Press, 2010), 245. 
6 Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” 2.  
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– Innovations that magnify future risk of continued proliferation.7  
These dangers speak to the increased importance of an effective counter-
proliferation (CP) strategy and policy that is commensurate with the changing 
environment. Monitoring in support of existing treaties and agreements has been a 
cornerstone of thwarting illegal nuclear transactions since the Baruch Plan of 1946.8 
However, as highlighted by a 2014 Defense Science Board Task Force (DSBTF),  
The technical approach for monitoring cannot continue to derive only 
from treaty and agreement dictates for “point” compliance to the numbers 
and types formally agreed upon and geographically bounded. Proliferation 
in this future context is a continuous process for which persistent 
surveillance, tailored to the environment of concern, is needed. This leads 
to the need for a paradigm shift in which the boundaries are blurred 
between monitoring for compliance and monitoring for proliferation, 
between cooperative and unilateral measures. Monitoring will need to be 
continuous, adaptive, and continuously tested for its effectiveness against 
an array of differing, creative and adaptive proliferators.9 
The DSBTF also concluded that a portion of the long-term, cohesive engagement plan for 
facilitating a multi-faced monitoring process included a necessity for exploring 
crowdsourced applications that can aid on-going CP efforts.10 To this end, we have 
tailored our research to explore low-cost, high impact crowdsourcing tools to augment 
traditional CP lines of efforts that are focused on covert sensors, classified imagery 
analysis, and human intelligence.  
                                                 
7 David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Houston Wood, “Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: 
Mitigating the Threat,” Institute for Science and International Security, July 29, 2013. 
8 Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation 
(Santa Barbara, California: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 14–24. The Baruch Plan was the first plan to try and 
control nuclear activities and materials between the United States and Russia and was an attempt for 
international “monitoring” of nuclear stock piles. 
9 Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” 2. 
10 Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” 9. 
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B. RESEARCH STATEMENT AND QUESTION 
The Department of Defense (DOD) plays an integral role, but is only one of 
various government institutions that fulfill a responsibility towards CP.11 The DOD 
possesses unique capabilities, and authorities which are nested within its plan for 
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).12 In accordance with the Unified 
Command Plan (UCP) Change, signed by the president on August 4, 2016, U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) has officially assumed responsibility of the DOD 
portion of this national mission.13 As such, USSOCOM assumes the primary role of 
coordinating the Department of Defense’s CP plans with the rest of the U.S. Government. 
History has clearly demonstrated that USSOCOM excels at a variety of crisis 
operations, but now faces the challenge of integrating a broad array of CP activities with 
a wide variety of agencies and ongoing programs associated with CP. Additionally, 
USSOCOM will assume its new mission in addition to numerous other tasks within its 
purview – most notably Counterterrorism (CT). As with any entity, USSOCOM will be 
faced with prioritizing and appropriating resources to adequately address the full range of 
its responsibilities. This thesis looks to highlight innovative, low cost, high impact tools 
to gain a more thorough understanding of proliferation network operations in the steady 
state. 
As part of the effort to integrate USSOCOM within existing CP efforts, we argue 
that there is additional human capital that has untapped potential for contribution to the 
CP mission. There are multiple pilot programs, including the “Force of the Future 
Initiative” and “Hack the Pentagon,” that seek the assistance of the technologically adept, 
                                                 
11 Derek W. Lothringer, Matthew S. McGraw, Matthew D. Rautio, and Leif Thaxton, 
“Counterproliferation, Disruptive Innovation, and the Need to Improve Collaboration.” Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 2015, 14. 
12 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3-40 – Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf. Accessed August 19, 2016. 
13 Department of Defense, “Unified Command Plans – USSOCOM.” http://www.defense.gov/
Military-Services/Unified-Combatant-Commands. Accessed August 19, 2016. 
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commercial sector.14 In light of the UCP modification, new opportunities exist to 
advance USSOCOM, the Department of Defense, and National CP policies. While the 
task of monitoring contemporary nuclear black markets has become an increasingly more 
difficult task, we believe that technology may be exploited to play a more pivotal role in 
undermining proliferation rings, rather than an obstacle. 
In the same 2014 DSBTF report, a recommendation was put forward to the 
Director of National Intelligence to “expand the use of open source and commercial 
information to focus search areas and reduce demand on the national collection assets so 
that the collection system can keep up better with the expansion of targeted areas of 
interest.”15 The underlining emphasis on this recommendation was that, crowdsourcing 
applications provide an opportunity to alleviate resources and manpower from open-
source commercial satellite imagery analysis. This is an acknowledgement of the growing 
acceptance of crowdsourcing applications as a whole.   
Missing from this recommendation, however, is a detailed analysis of the types of 
crowdsourcing platforms that present credible opportunities for CP policies and 
operations. So far, little research has been conducted into successful crowdsourcing 
applications to ascertain relevant methodologies that may be useful to CP. With 
USSOCOM’s new role in CP, exploring these new techniques is imperative. Our research 
question is as follows:   
Are there successful crowd-sourcing techniques and can they be used to augment 
existing efforts for monitoring nuclear proliferation networks?  
                                                 
14 Ash Carter, “Force of the Future, Initiative by Defense Secretary Ash Carter,” Defense.Gov, 
accessed June 29, 2016.  http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0315_Force-of-the-Future. 
Additionally, the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUX) is an Ash Carter initiative that 
attempts to link technology to the military as an established mechanism for the private sector and Armed 
Forces interface. https://www.diux.mil/#intro-2. 
15 Department of Defense Defense Science Board, “Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” 3.  
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C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
Our research suggests that crowdsourcing solutions can aid on-going, open-source 
intelligence gathering methods that are already being conducted by DOD and the 
interagency to further illuminate portions of a nuclear proliferation network. There is 
room for leveraging the capacity of concerned citizens who share the same ideals on 
ensuring that non-state actors and rogue states do not acquire nuclear components, 
materials, or weapons. Furthermore, our research suggests that USSOCOM may have an 
unconventional tool for in-extremis search operations.   
While our research highlights the benefits of crowd-sourcing and the use of 
incentive structures for galvanizing everyday citizens to participate in CP, it also 
addresses skepticism about this new tool. Our recommendations on utilizing everyday 
citizens as a means for geo-locating nuclear material takes into account claims about the 
inaccuracy of information that is obtained in this manner. There is potential for 
crowdsourcing materials to be maliciously infused with misleading information and 
errant conclusions. We also recognize that the recruitment of these individuals towards 
CP presents significant policy considerations and most likely, revisions in authorities for 
it certain applications of this technology to fully harnessed. However, previous research 
has already concluded current CP policy is muddled with over-lapping roles and 
authorities that cause confusion and a systemic lack of coordination.16   
Our literature review will introduce the reader to the role of social networks in 
society and the foundation behind incentive based rewards structures. The networks and 
societal structures discussed are viewed through a contemporary, technologically 
dominated lens that sheds light on the ease and manner in which ideas diffuse between 
individuals. Additionally, this chapter will explore current research into the field of 
crowdsourcing so that the reader understands the history behind these concepts and its 
burgeoning role in the United States Government (USG). Furthermore, it will introduce 
                                                 
16 Lothringer et al., “Counterproliferation, Disruptive Innovation, and the Need to Improve 
Collaboration,” 53–58. 
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to the reader the concept of crowdsourced geospatial data and the potential role that this 
specific area of crowdsourcing has future CP operations   
Chapter III will then provide the reader with a baseline knowledge of the 
evolution of proliferation. We will chronicle proliferation by providing a line of departure 
so that the reader can understand the organizational characteristics of a proliferation 
network. The final portion of this chapter will apply a modern business practice model to 
proliferation networks and critically examine motivations to determine the inherent 
strengths and vulnerabilities of these networks. The chapter will conclude after having 
provided the reader with an understanding of how proliferation networks can be targeted 
by crowdsourcing applications.  
Chapter IV will discuss time critical social mobilization, specifically focusing on 
crowdsourcing and its potential towards real-time reporting, geo-locational searches, and 
information validation. Multiple case studies will be reviewed in order to demonstrate to 
the reader the pervasiveness of these applications in modern society, as well as, provide 
insights into how future crowd-sourcing programs can be applied to CP.   
Chapter V will address the skeptical views of crowdsourcing tools and provides 
feedback on how crowdsourcing is a self-regulating process. This chapter presents 
arguments and counterarguments that look at how crowdsourcing can spread 
misinformation, is limited when applied in denied environments, and is susceptible to 
false identity attacks. However, by the end of this chapter, the reader is able to realize 
that many of the perceptions, about the limits of crowdsourcing, are largely misattributed 
and that the open-source nature of crowdsourcing means that the drawbacks of this 
methodology are consistently being remedied. 
Our final chapter will provide the reader with specific methodologies that have 
proven successful in crowdsourcing exercises and applications. We will show this low-
cost, high impact tool may provide USSOCOM with timely and accurate analysis that can 
complement existing CP lines of effort. The incorporation of these new tools for 
enhancing monitoring efforts against proliferation networks is imperative as nefarious 
organizations leverage new technologies for themselves. It is our desire to ensure that 
8 
USSOCOM remains ahead of these technological curves and is positioned to thwart 
the ambitions of those who seek to use nuclear weapons before the consequences 
become catastrophic. 
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II. SOCIAL NETWORK INCENTIVES AND CROWDSOURCING 
One of the more alarming aspects of the nuclear proliferation market today is the 
existence of files that detail the entire nuclear acquisition and production process.17 
Given this, the exponential growth of the internet over the last two decades seems to 
indicate that the task of CP is becoming an increasingly more difficult mission to 
accomplish. However, the ascendency of the internet as the world’s primary medium for 
communication presents unique opportunities for monitoring proliferation networks. Our 
review of the relevant literature seeks to explore two veins of research: the role of social 
networks and the development of incentive mechanisms for rallying large numbers of 
people.  
The first approach explores the small world phenomenon and examines how 
information gathering tasks are facilitated between nodes in a network. The second 
approach examines contemporary theories that explore methods for incentivizing nodal 
feedback when information requests are distributed across these networks. We end this 
portion by exploring how these two areas of research have become the cornerstones for 
foundational research and application into the world of crowdsourcing. The combination 
of these theoretical approaches provides a more illuminated picture for understanding 
how the ascendance of the internet presents an opportunity for better understanding the 
networks of nuclear ambitious rogue state and actors, instead of a veil for their 
operations. 
A. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS 
A social network can best be described as a collection of individuals with 
corresponding ties to other individuals in subnetworks, where links between every 
individual in a network ties all together.18 A closer examination of social networks can, 
                                                 
17 Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the 
A. Q. Khan Network, 242–243. 
18 Duncan J. Watts, Peter S. DODds, and M.E. J. Newman, “Identity and Search in Social Networks,” 
Science 296 (2002): 1302. 
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in many instances, highlight the emergence of what is known as the small world 
phenomenon, where seemingly unknown individuals share one or more ties to one 
another through a series of intermediaries. Jon Kleinberg best described this occurrence 
as “two individuals in the network [who] are likely to be connected through a short 
sequence of intermediate acquaintances.”19  In other words, the number of individuals 
that separate two individuals who are unknown to one another is relatively small. While 
researchers have often used this phenomenon to describe occurrences in a variety of 
fields, it is seen as one of the fundamental building blocks of the internet in describing its 
ability to serve as a medium for the rapid dissemination of ideas and information.20  
Prior to the emergence of the Internet, a well-known sociologist named Stanley 
Milgram began, in 1967, one of the first empirical studies to demonstrate that individuals 
across the world are in varying degrees all connected to one another.21 His seminal work 
into the small world phenomenon continued to be researched and explored by many 
others over the next forty years. Their findings revealed that social networks are indeed 
highly effective at identifying individuals through the shortest possible pathways.22  
Furthermore, these small networks are often irregularly, highly concentric and almost 
never random.23 Indeed, in 2002 over 60,000 individuals took part in an email 
experiment that demonstrated that social networks could be bridged across continents to 
one of 18 target persons with an average of only 4.1 degrees of separation.24 While it 
could be theorized that social media innovations, such as Facebook and Pinterest, have 
exacerbated the interconnectedness of the global community, foundational research 
                                                 
19 Jon M. Kleinberg, “The Small-World Phenomenon: An Algorithmic Perspective,” Cornell 
Computer Science Technical Report 99–1776 (1999), 1. 
20 Reka Albert, Hawoong Jeong, and Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, “The Diameter of the World Wide 
Web,” Nature 401 (1999) accessed September 2, 2016, https://arxiv.org/pdf/cond-mat/9907038v2.pdf. 
21 Stanley Milgram, “The Small World Problems,” Psychology Today 2 (1967): 60–67. 
22 Jon M. Kleinberg, “Navigation in a Small World,” Nature 406 (2000): 845; Lada Adamic and Eytan 
Adar, “How to Search a Social Network,” Social Networks 27 (2005): 187–203. 
23 Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks,” 
Nature 393 (1998): 440–442. 
24 Peter S. DODds, Roby Muhamad, and Duncan J. Watts, “An Experimental Study of Search in 
Global Social Networks,” Science 301 (2003): 827–829.  
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seems to conclude that even before their arrival the world was much smaller than it is 
sometimes believed. 
In pursuit of a better understanding of the small world phenomenon, it is 
important to conceptually understand what exactly the small world phenomenon is. To 
this end we revisit Milgram’s experiment to better grasp the relevance of social networks 
in establishing links to rogue proliferation networks. His experiments typically began 
with a random individual living in a remote location, such as Kansas or Nebraska, who 
was then given instructions to send a package to individual unknown to them in 
Massachusetts. The person chosen to send the package was then given the target person’s 
name, address, and occupation, as well as, instructions to only mail the package to 
individuals that they intimately knew. The idea was for individuals in the experiment to 
only use their personal contacts towards finding a “friend of a friend of a friend,” so that 
eventually the package would reach the specified individual in Massachusetts. This 
experiment was successfully replicated over the course of several more trials and became 
the cornerstone of the pop-culture phrase “six degrees of separation.”25 
While the study of small world phenomenon has mostly been focused on 
friendship26 or religious27 networks, there is growing literature into the implications of 
the phenomenon on acquaintance networks. In these types of networks, the link between 
individuals can almost be described as economic in nature as the tie between each is for 
mutual benefit.28 The utility of these studies is that they serve as useful tools in 
illuminating collaboration patterns between individuals and expose patterns that can aid 
in understanding how ideas and innovation are disseminated. Unsurprisingly, the 
                                                 
25 John Guare, Six Degrees of Separation: A Play (Vintage Books: New York, 1990), 5. 
26 T.J. Fararo and Morris J. Sunshine, A Study of a Biased Friendship Network (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1967), accessed August 28, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
248715600_A_Study_of_a_Biased_Friendship_Net; James Moody and Douglas R. White, “Structural 
Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Concept of Social Groups,” American Sociological Review 
68(1) (2003): 1120–1134. 
27 Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, “Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and 
Recruitment to Cults and Sects,” American Journal of Sociology 85(6) (1980): 1376–1395. 
28 L. A. N. Amaral, A. Scala, M. Barthelemy, and H. E. Stanley, “Classes of Small-World Networks,” 
Proceedings from the National Academy of Science 97 (2000): 11149-11152 accessed September 2, 2016 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC17168/#B2 
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scientific and academic world has produced substantial literature over the years with 
regards to the phenomenon’s impact on their networks.29 One of the most revealing of 
these studies was one conducted by M. E. J. Newman. In this study he systematically 
analyzed millions of papers and authors who were published in varying scientific fields 
over the course of five years. While his results generally supported the small world 
phenomenon across all the fields, there were notable differences between each scientific 
community. A significant aspect of his results was the staggeringly high levels of 
collaboration amongst scientists involved in the arena of experimental high-energy 
physics.30 However, the truly unique feature in each of these networks, a trait that 
remains consistent amongst even internet social media sites, is that collaboration amongst 
these networks of scientists and researchers is being organized by themselves. From this 
beginning we sought to determine if there were ways that incentives could be used to 
create demands for information within these pre-existing networks that are not rooted in 
merely the altruistic nature of individuals. 
B. THE ROLE OF INCENTIVES 
Over the last decade-and-a-half, significant research has been dedicated to better 
understanding the nature of querying across networks of peers and determining how ideas 
                                                 
29 Leo Egghe and Ronald Rousseau. Introduction to Informetrics (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Publishers, 1990).; Paul Hoffman, The Man Who Only Loved Numbers (New York: Hyperion, 1998); Diana 
Crane, “Social Structure in a Group of Scientists: A Test of the ‘Invisible College’ Hypothesis,” American 
Sociological Review 34–3 (1969): 335–352; G. Melin and O. Persson, “Studying Research Collaboration 
Using Co-Authorships,” Scientometrics 36 (1996): 363–377; G. Melin, “The Networking University,” 
Scientometrics 35 (1996): 15–31; Ying Ding, Schubert Foo, and Gobinda Chowdhury, “A Bibliometric 
Analysis of Collaboration in the Field of Information Retrieval,” The International Information & Library 
Review 30 (1999): 367–376. 
30 M. E. J. Newman, “The Structure of Scientific Collaboration Networks,” Proceedings from the 
National Academy of Science 98 (2001): 408–409, accessed September 21, 2016 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC14598/pdf/pq000404.pdf. 
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are distributed in a non-hierarchical fashion.31 The genesis of this research has obviously 
been the arrival of internet social networking websites that have successfully served as 
platforms for individuals to not only connect to one another as friends, but also in the 
assistance of finding homes, jobs, or even raising money for charitable causes. These 
social networking websites successfully allow individuals to pose queries and receive 
answers across networks of indirect individual through an informal method of vetting and 
merely replicate in the online world our natural inclinations of information gathering.32 It 
is for this very reason that several research systems were developed to create artificial 
reference systems to duplicate humanity’s innate method of referrals.33 
Unfortunately, unlike computer-based referral systems, not all social networks are 
successful at providing answers to queries that are promulgated. In our own daily lives it 
is not uncommon to find an email or text has gone unanswered for days even though it 
was sent to the right person. Previous studies into human network querying noted this 
frequent occurrence and sought ways to end the premature termination of query chains.34 
Simply put, altruism and the pursuit of information is sometimes not enough to always 
get answers when they are posed. Additional incentive mechanisms, whether positive or 
negative, were therefore seen as necessary in eliciting timely responses. Researchers first 
                                                 
31 Eng Keong Lua, Jon Crowcroft, Marcelo Pias, Ravi Sharma, and Steven Lim, “A Survey and 
Comparison of Peer-toPeer Overlay Network Schemes,” IEEE Communications Survey and Tutorial 
(March 2004): Eric Hand, “Citizen Science: People Power,” Nature 466 (2010): 685–687; Jan Lorenz, 
Heiko Rauhut, Frank Schweitzer, and Dirk Helbing, “How Social Influence Can Undermine the Wisdom of 
Crowd Effect,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108 (2011) accessed September 29, 2016, 
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1008636108; James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter 
Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economics, Societies, and Nations (New 
York: Double Day Books, 2004). 
32 Bonnie A. Nardi, Steve Whittaker, and Heinrich Schwarz, “It’s Not What You Know, It’s Who You 
Know: Work in the Information Age,” First Monday 5 (2000) accessed September 27, 2016 
http://firstmonday.org/article/view/741/650. 
33 Henry Kautz, Bart Selman, and Mehul Shah, “Referral Web: Combining Social Networks and 
Collaborative Filtering,” Communications of the ACM, 30, 3 (March 1997);  Bin Yu and Munindar P. 
Singh, “Searching Social Networks,” In Proceedings of the Second International Joint Conference on 
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, ACM (2003): 65–72; Michael N. Huhns, Uttam 
Mukhopadhyay, Larry M. Stephens, and Ronald D. Bonnell, “DAI for Document Retrieval: The MINDS 
Project,” in Distributed Artificial Intelligence, ed. Michael N. Huhns (London: Pitman/Morgan Kaufmann, 
1987), 249–283. 
34 Winter Mason and Duncan J. Watts, “Financial Incentives and the ‘Performance of Crowds,’” 
SIGKDD Explorations 11 (2009): 100–108. 
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began their efforts into the creation of incentive mechanisms by transplanting economic 
theory into the world of peer-to-peer networks.35 In lieu of information, individuals were 
incentivized to respond to network queries via the reception of tangible goods, services, 
or money.   
The development of financial incentives to orchestrate successful feedback in 
large-scale querying networks is therefore seen as a necessary task in ensuring that 
individuals answer questions that are posed to them. A second necessary task though, is 
financially incentivizing individuals to play a role in the recruitment of others when they 
themselves are unable to provide the right answers.36 To solve this dilemma, Kleinberg 
and Raghavan created the Query Incentive Model.37  Their model was built upon prior 
models that sought to mathematically recreate the same principles that marketing 
companies use to elicit similar results in the rapid diffusion of ideas, services, and 
goods.38 The process is a variant of the sub-contracting process and requires the use of 
fixed payments to gain user feedback. Figure 1 shows a branching tree model of this idea. 
Fixed rewards are established along a tree of individuals where rewards are provided to 
each of the nodes along the process to encourage participation. These rewards are 
established prior to the commencement of querying and terminate when the chain reaches 
a pre-established threshold for participation, or an answer is provided. It is from this 
                                                 
35 Alberto Blanc, Yi-Kai Liu, and Amin Vahdat, “Designing Incentives for Peer-to-Peer Routing,” In 
Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies 1 
(2005): 374–385; Sepandar, Kamvar, Beverly Yang, and Hector Garcia-Molina, “Addressing the Non-
Cooperation Problem in Competitive P2P Systems,” In Workshop on Peer-to-Peer and Economics (2003);  
Barath Raghavan and Alex C. Snoeren, “Priority Forwarding in Ad Hoc Networks with Self-Interested 
Parties,” In Workshop on Peer-to-Peer and Economics (2003); Bin Yu and Munindar P. Singh, “Incentive 
Mechanisms for Peer-to-Peer Systems,” In Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Agents 
and Peer-to-Peer Computing, ACM (2003). 
36 Duncan J. Watts and Jonah Peretti, “Virtual Marketing for the Real World,” Harvard Business 
Review (May 2007) accessed September 28, 2016 https://hbr.org/2007/05/viral-marketing-for-the-real-
world. 
37  Jon Kleinberg and Prabhakar Raghavan, “Query Incentive Networks,” in Proceedings of the 2005 
46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2005). 
38 Cuihong Li, Bin Yu, and Katia Sycara, “An Incentive Mechanism for Message Relaying in Peer-to-
Peer Discovery,” 2nd Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (2009) accessed September 15, 
2016 https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~softagents/papers/p2p_econ.pdf;  Eyal Biyalogorsky, Eitan Gerstner , and 
Barak Libai, “Customer Referral Management: Optimal Reward Programs,” Marketing Science 20 (1) 
(2001): 82–95. 
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model that many of the case studies that we will analyze in Chapter IV extrapolate their 
methodology for incentivizing individuals to participate in their exercises. 
Figure 1.  Kleinberg and Raghavan’s Propagation of a Query with Rewards.  
Source: Jon Kleinberg and Prabhakar Raghavan, “Query Incentive Networks,” in 
Proceedings of the 2005 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer 
Science (IEEE Computer Society, Washington, D.C., 2005), 2. 
 
So far our literature review has comprehensively explored how social networks 
provide simple and short paths between individuals across continents that would 
seemingly have no connection to one another. We have also explored the importance of 
developing incentive mechanisms that encourage individuals to not only play a role in 
answering questions posed to them, but also encouraging others to do so. It is at this point 
that we began to explore how technology has married itself to the previously mentioned 
literature and provided a new tool for exploring ways in which USSOCOM can continue 
to analyze proliferation networks in a more innovative way.  
C. CROWDSOURCING 101 
In the modern world, elements of online social communities pervade nearly every 
element of life and have exposed radical new ideas on collaboration. Message boards and 
instant messaging have given way to behemoth social collaboration tools such as 
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Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. These new tools have, on several occasions, 
demonstrated their unique ability to organize large networks of people to perform 
collective operations towards the same purpose through the internet; a technique known 
as crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing was originally conceived as a way for software and 
digital video firms to outsource their developing projects for cheap labor around the 
world.39 Since its inception, however, the rise of social media tools have shown that 
crowdsourcing can be an excellent way for leveraging communications and information 
technologies in search operations. 
Defining exactly what constitutes crowdsourcing can be a bit tricky since there’s 
no academic consensus on its exact definition. The term was first coined by Jeff Howe in 
the June 2006 issue of Wired magazine and was later given a more definitive definition 
by its author in one of his later blogposts.40 
Simply defined, crowdsourcing represents the act of a company or 
institution taking a function once performed by employees and 
outsourcing it to an undefined (a generally large) network of people in the 
form of an open call. This can take the form of peer-production (when the 
job is performed collaboratively), but is also often undertaken by sole 
individuals. The crucial prerequisite is the use of the open call format and 
the large network of potential laborers.41 
However, this initial attempt at defining what crowdsourcing is can be a bit 
restrictive as it only enlists people for explicit collaboration. A variety of platforms now 
exist that implicitly enlist individuals for crowdsourcing purposes, such as the labeling of 
images within the contexts of a game.42 Furthermore, there are other examples, such as 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk-based systems, that were used to aid in the geo-location 
services of a person lost out at sea but were supported by no known community of 
                                                 
39 Jeff Howe, “The Rise of Crowdsourcing,” Wired Magazine 14.06 (2006), accessed May 16, 2016, 
http://sistemas-humano-computacionais.wdfiles.com/local--files/capitulo%3Aredes-sociais/
Howe_The_Rise_of_Crowdsourcing.pdf. 
40 Jeff Howe, “The Rise of Crowdsourcing,” 1. 
41 Jeff Howe, “Crowdsourcing: A Definition,” Crowdsourcing: Tracking the Rise of the Amateur, June 
2, 2006 http://crowdsourcing.typepad.com/cs/2006/06/crowdsourcing_a.html. 
42 Luis von Ahn and Laura Dabbish, “Labeling Images with a Computer Game,” In Proceedings of 
CHI (2004) accessed October 3, 2016 http://ael.gatech.edu/cs6452f13/files/2013/08/labeling-images.pdf. 
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individuals (merely unidentifiable Internet users who were altruistically motivated to help 
find him).43 This system though was nonetheless performing a crowdsourcing type 
function even though it did not quite fit into Howe’s first definition. 
A much simpler and clearer way of defining crowdsourcing would be that it is any 
system that harnesses the collective capabilities of humans to solve a clearly defined 
problem set. By defining crowdsourcing in this fashion we can remove any restrictions 
that could be imposed by the types of collaboration that are being conducted or the types 
of problems we are trying to solve. Doan et al. came to the same conclusion that our 
literature review found and expounded on this more open definition of crowdsourcing by 
developing four questions that would help them characterize some of the challenges and 
solutions to crowdsourcing programs.44  We used their questions as a basis for the 
formation of our own, to organize and characterize the crowdsourcing case studies 
discussed in this research: How does this platform recruit and retain individuals?, What 
contributions can these individuals make to the platform?, How does this platform use 
crowdsourcing to solve the target problem? How does this platform evaluate user 
contributions and address false-identity attacks? These questions provide our research 
with a method for analyzing the different types of crowdsourcing platforms that the 
government could use and distinguishes each from one another. 
D. WHERE IS CROWDSOURCING? 
 One of the most well-known crowdsourcing platforms in existence is 
Wikipedia,45 a commercial company whose entire business platform is centered on the 
idea that the knowledge base of the many is equal to that of an expert few. As a 
participant in the world of short factual information displays, Wikipedia’s biggest 
competitor is the Encyclopedia Britannica, the standard-bearer for expert facts and 
                                                 
43 Michael Olson, “The Amateur Search,” SIGMOD Record 37, 2 (2008) accessed October 8, 2016 
http://sigmod.org/publications/sigmodRecord/0806/p21.olson.pdf. 
44 Anhai Doan, Raghu Ramakrishnan, and Alon Y. Halevy, “Crowdsourcing Systems on the World-
Wide Web,” Communications of the ACM 54(4) (2011) accessed October 1, 2016 doi:10.1145/
1924421.1924442. 
45 “Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopedia,” n.d., http://www.wikipedia.org. 
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opinions. However, since 2012, Encyclopedia Britannica has gone completely online and 
debate has loomed over the reliability of crowdsourced facts and ideas versus the 
generated input of experts in a variety of fields.46 Recent studies though have shown that 
the reliability of Wikipedia versus the Encyclopedia Britannica indicate only slight 
differences in factual accuracy and editorial bias between the two.47 In many ways this 
has validated the concept that there is room in commercial and intellectual enterprises for 
harnessing the power of the many to create viable solutions and answers. 
The rise of these crowdsourcing platforms has paralleled the radical expansion of 
social media enterprises over the last ten years. During the time, corporations have 
increasingly sought ways of harnessing the collective wisdom of crowds and have turned 
towards social media platforms to generate user-input that will strengthen what they are 
producing or developing.48 With nearly 80 percent of the world population, including 
those living in remote locations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, now having some 
medium for accessing social media sites, the growing emphasis on looking to crowds for 
answers seems to be a growing trend.49 The ability of social media sites to galvanizes 
individuals towards a cause has fundamentally altered the way that many of these citizens 
                                                 
46 Joab Jackson, “Encyclopedia Britannica Goes Online-Only,” Computer World, March 26, 2012, 
accessed October 4, 2016, “http://www.computerworld.com/article/2503203/internet/encyclopaedia-
britannica-goes-online-only.html. 
47 Michael Blanding, “Wikipedia Or Encyclopedia Britannica: Which Has More Bias?,” Forbes, 
January 20, 2015, accessed October 16, 2017, http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2015/01/
20/wikipedia-or-encyclopaedia-britannica-which-has-more-bias/#759a8d931ccf; Shane Greenstein and 
Feng Zhu, “Do Experts or Collective Intelligence Write with More Bias? Evidence from Encyclopedia 
Britannica and Wikipedia,” (working paper, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, 2016); Daniel 
Terdiman, “Study: Wikipedia as Accurate as Britannica,” CNET, December 16, 2005, accessed October 15, 
2016, https://www.cnet.com/news/study-wikipedia-as-accurate-as-britannica/. 
48 Paul Massey, “The Rise of Crowdsourcing in Corporate Social Responsibility,” HuffingtonPost, 
May 25, 2011, accessed October 3, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-massey/the-rise-of-
crowdsourcing_b_821357.html. 
49 William D. Eggers and Paul Macmillan, The Solution Revolution (Boston: Harvard Business 
Review Press, 2013), 63. 
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interact with their governments and in places such the US, India, and Iraq, have been a 
cornerstone for citizen-driven policy changes.50   
In recognition of the significance that social media and crowdsourcing is having, 
many agencies within the U.S. Government have begun to explore the potential of these 
platforms to complement their current capabilities. For instance, the CIA’s Open Source 
Center analyzes and aggregates massive amounts of Facebook messages, Twitter feeds, 
and online blogs to gauge social media attitudes abroad on a daily basis.51 This 
information is then cross-referenced with newspapers and reports to assess local 
sentiment in foreign countries. Even the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), the tech incubator of the Department of Defense (DOD), has invested in this 
technology, known as meme-tracking, to “track the formation, development and spread of 
ideas and concepts, use linguistic clues to ferret out purposeful or deceptive 
misinformation, and use sentiment analysis and opinion mining … [to] identify credible 
threats reverberating across cyberspace.”52 On November 1, 2016, the U.S. Navy began 
testing a crowdsourced mobile application that would provide its sailors with a way to 
report safety concerns and violations, as well as, propose new ideas for risk management 
called LiveSafe.53 All this points to the fact that these tools are not simply meant for 
business or educational enterprises, but are also being increasingly used to complement 
existing U.S. Government programs. 
                                                 
50 Jenna Wortham, “Public Outcry over Antipiracy Bills Began as Grass-Roots Grumbling,” New York 
Times, January 19, 2012, accessed October 3, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/
public-outcry-over-antipiracy-bills-began-as-grass-roots-grumbling.html?pagewanted=all; “Cleaning Out 
Corruption in India,” Avaaz, accessed October 3, 2016, www.avaz.org/en/highlights--corruption.php; 
“Profit with Purpose,” Economist, January 26, 2013, accessed October 3, 2016, www.economist.com/news/
business/21570763-how-profit-firm-fosters-protest-profit-purpose?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/profit_with_purpose. 
51 Jared Keller, “How the CIA Uses Social Media to Track How People Feel,” The Atlantic, 
November 4, 2011, accessed October 4, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/11/
how-the-cia-uses-social-media-to-track-how-people-feel/247923/. 
52 Jared Keller, “The Pentagon Enters the Social Web with a Call for Memetrackers,” The Atlantic, 
August 2, 2011, accessed October 4, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/the-
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53 Mark D. Faram, “Navy to test crowd-sourcing safety app in Hampton Roads, Spain,” NavyTimes, 
November 1, 2016, accessed November 2, 2016, https://www.navytimes.com/articles/navy-to-test-
crowdsourcsing-app-in-hampton-roads. 
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E. CROWDSOURCED GEOSPATIAL DATA (CGD) 
Unfortunately, the relatively new application of crowdsourcing and the closely 
related field of studying social media has created confusion in terms of names. Many 
books have labeled crowdsourcing as other names, such as Wikinomics or the Wisdom 
Crowds.54 The Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of 
International Studies even has an all-encompassing term for the amalgamation of these 
two ideas, plus other related fields, known simply as new media.55  Our research is 
focused specifically on the application of crowdsourcing technologies that allow users to 
participate in geospatial analysis. By this we are referring to the employment of a large 
body of users who actively collaborate to create, contribute, edit, and display geospatial 
data to help solve problems outside of the normal governmental channels. 
Over the last decade, advancements in geo-technology and the internet have 
increased interests in geospatial science.56 Two terms have been used to describe the 
crowdsourcing of geospatial data. The first to describe this specific field of 
crowdsourcing was Michael F. Goodchild. He labeled the participation of users towards 
the aggregation of geospatial data as volunteered geographic information (VGI).57 In a 
follow-up study in 2013 by the Army Corps of Engineers, the application of VGI for 
governmental purposes was referred to as crowdsourced geospatial data (CGD).58  In 
this study, CGD was defined as a non-authoritative approach to geospatial data 
                                                 
54 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Doubleday, 2004); Don Tapscott and 
Anthony D. Williams, Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything (New York: Portfolio, 
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55 Bryan S. Lee, Jeffrey Lewis, and Melissa Hanham, “Assessing the Potential of Societal Verification 
by Means of New Media” (CCC PASCC Report, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
January 2014). 
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57 Michael F. Goodchild, “Citizens as Sensors: The World of Volunteered Geography,” GeoJournal 
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production and distribution.59  The specification of CGD as a non-authoritative approach 
is meant to clearly delineate the separation of geospatial data production on the internet 
from the more traditional production of this type of information by government agencies 
or publishing firms such as Rand McNally or the National Geographic Society.   
Amateur production of geospatial data has traditionally been impeded by the 
immense technical and financial resources required to undertake these types of 
operations. This has led many in the government and the afore-mentioned agencies to 
view with skepticism the benefits of CGD. However, the emerging benefits of CGD are 
now being realized and new ways of incorporating CGD into parallel authoritative 
processes is now being investigated.60 Studies into these benefits have focused 
specifically on the benefits of local expertise that CGD provides to the more traditional, 
authoritative production of geospatial data. As Goodchild suggests, “hybrid solutions to 
the production of geographic data may very well represent the best of both worlds.”61   
This study expands on the definition of CGD as merely a platform for reviewing, 
vetting, and editing commercial imagery. We add to the growing literature on 
crowdsourcing for geospatial purposes by including within CGD any application that 
seeks to answer the question of where a person, place, or thing is. A broader definition of 
this term allows our recommendations to build upon existing terminology and explore 
crowdsourced applications that have specific utility in unraveling where proliferation 
networks are operating. While social media analysis is a similar to CGD in many ways, it 
is distinct from CGD in the sense that users in social media analysis are only studied, not 
queried for answers or solutions. CGD requires user participation and is a distinct 
methodology designed to harness collective information, thoughts, and opinions towards 
a specific cause or solution. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to utilize the insights of this body of knowledge to 
examine methods to incentivize social networks towards realizing the recommendations 
of the 2014 Defense Science Board’s Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification 
Technologies about harnessing crowdsourcing technologies. Our research looks at the 
commercial and academic application of CGD techniques to determine if there is a way 
to complement existing CP efforts. Our intention is to review case studies of 
crowdsourcing programs and then extrapolate from these programs methods that could 
then be used as the cornerstones for a USSOCOM sponsored program where CGD it is 
used as part of a multilateral approach to analyzing commercial imagery and time-critical 
search operations. Furthermore, it is our intention to demonstrate that outreach into the 
online world can provide an innovative, low-cost, high impact medium for unraveling 
ways in which specific social networks could be harnessed to expose potentially new 
ways that proliferation networks are evolving themselves with new technologies. In the 
following chapter we scope our research so that the reader will begin to understand how 
nuclear proliferation networks operate and where CGD can best be applied to. 
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III. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION NETWORKS 
This chapter aims to characterize proliferation networks in a manner that lends to 
a more thorough interpretation of contemporary and future network structure that is 
applicable to counter-proliferation efforts. The chapter will do this by beginning with a 
concise historical overview. The following section will define a nuclear proliferation 
network and discuss the general structure of nuclear proliferation networks to ascertain 
points of vulnerability. Next, it will explore common business practices that apply to 
typical proliferation network functions and reveal the supply and demand side to 
proliferation. Supply and demand will then segue into a description of first and second 
tier proliferation in relation to historic, contemporary, and future networks. Finally, 
characteristics of a proliferation network are highlighted with an overall aim to discern 
shortcomings and weak-points in network structure and/or characteristics that can aid in 
analyzing illicit nuclear trade. 
A. PROLIFERATION FROM INCEPTION 
 An introduction to nuclear proliferation history creates a helpful framework for 
understanding current and future proliferation trends. Proliferation, for the purposes of 
this research, carries with it a nuclear connotation and is defined as, “the spread of 
nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and 
information.”62 This definition is used on an international level and recognized by all 
nation states party to the NPT.   
With its roots in the Manhattan Project, The United States (with assistance from 
scientists from many other countries) was the pioneer of nuclear weapons, fostering 
                                                 
62  “Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” Taken from website of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency IAEA. Accessed May 24, 2016. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/
publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf. 
The Treaty officially recognized Great Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States 
as the Five Nuclear Nation States. Stipulations within the treaty require the nations to agree not to spread 
nuclear bomb-making technology; the only two that did not sign the treaty (until 1992) were China and 
France. 
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nuclear technology from concept to employment.63 In 1949, Russia was able to reach 
nuclear parity following a clandestine penetration of the Manhattan Project. 
Subsequently, Great Britain, with assistance from the US, was the next nation to acquire 
nuclear capability, closely followed by France, and then China in 1964. Though not 
acknowledged officially, reports suggest that Israel was successful in its quest to become 
a nuclear state in 1967.64 
Until the 1960s, many believed that only advanced nation-states possessed the 
intellectual capital and technical infrastructure necessary to construct a nuclear weapon. 
However, the rapid evolution of technology diffusion caused proliferation concerns to 
take center stage. President John F. Kennedy feared that “by the early 1970s, more than 
20 nation states may possess the [nuclear] weapons.”65 The ensuing nuclear phobia 
resulted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)66 of 1970, which was drafted as a 
preventative approach –  non-proliferation approach – to controlling nuclear proliferation, 
and contained three main premises: Civilian Nuclear Sharing, Non-Proliferation, and 
Strategic Arms Reductions.67 The treaty required that special attention be paid to the five 
states in possession of nuclear weapons - as officially recognized by the NPT. 
Additionally, the NPT stipulated that nations wishing to pursue nuclear exploits for 
civilian purposes, such as for alternative energy production, could do so with the 
understanding they would be subject to random inspection by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). As another means to curb appetites for nuclear weaponry, the 
NPT outlined that the five states possessing nuclear weapons would pursue disarmament, 
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as stipulated by Article V. Though the aim of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was to 
prevent additional nations from acquiring nuclear weapons, it contained shortcomings. 
The main loophole within the agreement “legitimized the sale of civil nuclear facilities 
(some of which could make nuclear explosive materials) if the recipient state or private 
company agreed to place these facilities under IAEA inspections and not to misuse them 
to make nuclear weapons.”68 
India, a nation that was not a signatory of the NPT, purchased a reactor from 
Canada for “civil nuclear energy development” and subsequently conducted an 
underground nuclear detonation in 1974. This “peaceful nuclear explosion” – as India 
would claim – motivated the U.S. and other countries to establish a system of controls on 
the sale of nuclear facilities capable of manufacturing weapons grade nuclear materials, 
no matter the intent.69 As nuclear supplier nations implemented new restrictions, 
proliferators such as South Africa and Pakistan discovered that nuclear facilities could be 
assembled by ordering pieces separately to avoid the international scrutiny of the IAEA. 
The two countries were then able to exploit the ambiguous nature of dual-use 
commodities exchanged in order to obscure standing import/export control measures. As 
safeguards and controls expanded to address the evolving threat, so too did the 
proliferation networks continue to adapt. 
B. KHAN’S PROLIFERATION ACADEMY 
Abdul Qadeer Khan constructed the most well-known, comprehensive 
international nuclear smuggling network by taking advantage of policy short-comings 
within the international controls system, and using his position within a Dutch nuclear 
engineering corporation. His exploits were made possible by capitalizing on the 
interdependence of global trade, but more specifically, the varying degrees and 
effectiveness of import/export control measures across the world. Additionally, his 
network enabled Pakistan to build an infrastructure for its bomb program and produce its 
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first weapon by the mid 1980s. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s black market activities directly 
resulted in Pakistan becoming a nuclear armed state. Furthermore, his network played a 
direct role in facilitating the nuclear weapons programs of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Libya.70 
The interdiction of the BBC China in 2003, a ship carrying nuclear components to 
support Libya’s now defunct nuclear weapons program, as well as the emergence of state 
actors who acquired nuclear weapons in direct violation of the NPT, demonstrated to the 
non-proliferation community that it had failed at its mission of halting the spread of 
nuclear weapons knowledge.71 Khan successfully established a network that reduced 
the barriers to entry for nuclear ambitious states. Over the course of two decades, 
he established a robust nuclear proliferation network capable of supplying “customers” 
with the plans, components, and technical expertise to produce a nuclear bomb. 
India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” invigorated Pakistan to leverage Khan’s access to 
nuclear weapons knowledge and materials to achieve nuclear parity in the region.72 In 
addition to being directly responsible for Pakistan’s subsequent assent to the status 
of a nuclear armed state, Khan was ushered onto the international stage as the 
most well-known proliferator of nuclear secrets in history.  
When A.Q. Khan was eventually forced to take asylum in Pakistan in 2003, his 
efforts had already left reverberating effects for non-proliferation and counter-
proliferation policy. Increased emphasis on CP operation was appropriate in light of non-
proliferation failures in Libya, North Korea and Iran. In addition to having profound 
policy implications, the nuclear networks themselves now have the blueprints to 
proliferate the most lethal weapons on the face of the earth.73  Pakistan’s assent to 
70 Albright, Peddling Peril:  How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies, 20–34; 
Alexander H. Montgomery, “Ringing In Proliferation” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), 
153–187. 
71 Bruno Gruselle, “Proliferation Networks and Financing,” 22.; “A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: 
How the Pakistani Built His Network,” The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/world/a-
tale-of-nuclear-proliferation-how-pakistani-built-his-network.html?_r=0. 
72 Albright, Peddling Peril:  How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York Free 
Press, 2010), 8. 
73 Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, 242–243. 
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nuclear power paved the way for the emergence of second tier proliferation and 
heightened CP efforts.  
Proliferation networks are the intermediaries which procure, market and traffic 
illegal nuclear materials and sub-components to the querying party. Albright expands on 
the definition of illicit nuclear trade stating that:  
Trafficking in nuclear commodities is trade that is not authorized by: 1) 
the state in which it originates; 2) under international law; 3) the states 
through which it transits; or 4) the state to which it is imported.74 
Research indicates that proliferation networks are, in fact, business oriented and naturally 
shrink from violence.75 Albright’s definition of illicit nuclear trade personifies the 
nuclear proliferation realm as an ambiguous market-place that manipulates common 
business practices to subvert import/export control measures designed to regulate dual-
use technologies. The Khan network incorporated various dummy corporations, 
intermediaries, trans-shipment locations, off-shore manufacturing in Malaysia and 
falsified documents and end-user certificates to navigate the murkiness of international 
regulations.76  Current proliferation networks will likely adapt themselves to satisfy the 
demands of malignant actors seeking nuclear weaponry, similar to the manner that Khan 
adapted his legitimate business practices to accommodate illegitimate endeavors. 
C. CHARACTERIZING PROLIFERATION NETWORKS 
USSOCOM is unparalleled in its ability to track and disrupt terrorist networks, 
but understanding the differences between counterterrorism and counter-proliferation will 
be critical to applying the appropriate force toward the vulnerabilities of a nuclear 
proliferation network. Nuclear proliferation networks cannot be likened to a door-to-door 
salesman that blindly pedals his/her merchandise to anyone willing to purchase it. Rather, 
as explained by Gruselle, a proliferation network is comprised of two distinct networks 
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working in concert with one another.77 Supplier networks and acquisition networks work 
conjointly to transform a demand signal into a deliverable product.  
For the purposes of this research, proliferation organizations are typically 
classified as rings, stars, or cliques based on their structure and the potential cut-points or 
cut-sets within their structure (see Figure 2).78 Cut points are the locations within the 
networks that if severed would result in the network separating into one or more pieces, 
while cut-sets are the removal of multiple pieces, that would yield the same shattering 
results.79 A ring is characterized by having each node within the group connected with 
two other nodes.80 A cut-point within the ring would not have adverse effects on the 
organization, albeit, the removal of two non-adjacent nodes or a cut-set may well yield 
the organization ineffective.81 The “star” model is highly vulnerable to an attack on the 
central person/organization, as it is the lifeline to the remaining members since every 
node runs through a central hub.82  Conversely, if a peripheral node of a star-shaped 
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Figure 2.  Simple Network Structures 
 
Source: Alexander Montgomery, “Ringing In Proliferation” International Security, vol. 
30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 153. 
 
A clique network is one in which every node is connected to the other nodes 
through n-number of ties.83 An attack on a singular node in the network is ineffective 
within a clique, but actions against a set of nodes can serve to isolate an organization 
within the node.84  State actors seeking to facilitate nuclear proliferation often use this 
form networking.85  As a result of the highly decentralized, robust nature of a clique 
organization, they are only vulnerable when an international coordinated attack against 
all of the nodes is undertaken. Pakistan was the central hub for Iran, Libya, Iraq, Syria, 
and North Korea when these countries sought to acquire illicit nuclear weapons 
capabilities (see Figure 3 for a representation of the “star” nature of the Pakistani second 
tier proliferation network). With an understanding of the general structure of the different 
types of proliferation networks and their respective vulnerabilities, we now focus our 
attention towards how proliferation businesses prosecute their endeavors. This is to 
ascertain whether or not there are opportunities for using crowd-sourcing techniques to 
better understand the fundamental structure of these businesses and how they operate. 
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Figure 3.  Pakistani Second Tier Proliferation Network  
 
Source: Gaurav Kampani, “Proliferation Unbound: Nuclear Tales from Pakistan” 
(Monterey, California: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for 
International Studies, February 23, 2004), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040223.htm. 
 
D. RISKY BUSINESS 
When discussing proliferation networks, it is important to note that they operate 
very similar to any modern, legitimate business. Since the aim of any actor seeking a 
nuclear yield can only be achieved using plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), 
we already know exactly what product they are looking for. Plutonium production and 
Uranium enrichment are processes that require a high degree of technical acuity and 
precise machining capabilities.86  In the same way that a legitimate business enterprise 
operates, parts and equipment must be aggregated to construct a production/maintenance 
facility that weaponizes nuclear material. Many of the parts for nuclear production are 
what are known as dual-use items, meaning that they have commercial and military 
application.87  These items are what can be considered a “shopping list.” Most are in fact 
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already found on U.S. control lists.88  However, the up-side for proliferators, with regards 
to these lists, are that they are now becoming so extensive that international inspectors 
face a herculean task when reviewing the export of controlled dual-use items. 
Additionally, not all states are party to international effort to counter proliferation, such 
as the Nuclear Suppliers Group,89 The Zangger Committee,90 or the Wassenaar 
Arrangement.91  As technology advances, the efficacy of these lists in thwarting nuclear 
proliferation will become increasingly more difficult to achieve.92 
Throughout this process, proliferation networks must maintain the ability to 
contact foreign companies for the purchase of dual-use commodities while 
simultaneously preventing the proper authorities from being alerted. To this end, 
intermediaries are often contracted and strategically chosen because of their ground-level, 
operational knowledge on export controls systems and what “normal” looks like in terms 
of shipments. A proliferation network will utilize front companies or dummy 
corporations to make purchases from the intermediaries and ensure the materials are 
transferred to their actual destination, using multiple cut-outs, or ways to disassociate 
themselves from an illicit purchase, whenever possible. After acquiring the necessary 
materials and component, the next step for proliferators is hiring consultants, such as 
nuclear scientists, specialists in metallurgical processes, and experts in circumnavigating 
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import/export controls.93  Countries with stringent export controls will force these 
contractors and sub-contractors to engage in a plethora of illegal activities, such as 
falsifying end-use documents, in order to attract as little attention from the authorities as 
possible.  
 Finally, like every business, the illicit nuclear market has financial transactions 
that will take place at numerous points while products are being purchased, shipped, and 
delivered to their final destinations. Though this portion can vary, proliferation networks 
can potentially conduct transactions valued at hundreds of millions of dollars.94  Since 
proliferation networks operate with such large amounts of illicit funds, they must 
diversify these funds in order to prevent market flooding, which would raise flags if 
noticed. Local front companies and intermediaries are paid in cash when possible; 
however, proliferation often spans trans-national borders, and results in finances 
inevitably deposited into banks and financial institutions globally.95 Proliferation 
networks employ economically-based tools of internationalization to circumvent 
prohibition systems in order to supply their customer. (See Figure 4 for an illustration of 
their business model.). 
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Figure 4.  Diagram of Proliferation Network Operations  
 
Source: Bruno Gruselle, “Proliferation Networks and Financing,” Fondation pour la 
Recherche Stratégique, 2007, 28. 
 
Insights from the case of the A.Q. Khan network illustrate that not only did Khan 
utilize legitimate business practices and state sponsorship to circumvent international 
controls, but legitimate, unwitting businesses were also used to transit materials and 
equipment.96 The network he erected is beneficial as a case of reference for two reasons: 
1) It serves as a historic example of a mature and successful nuclear proliferation model 
that can be applied in the context of our present circumstances. 2) Khan’s activities had 
more effect on nuclear proliferation than any individual or country in the last 30 years.97 
In addition to the A.Q. Khan exploits, a look at the contemporary and near future of 
second tier nuclear proliferation efforts of states like China, North Korea and Pakistan 
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demonstrate that many of the characteristics between proliferators (no matter the network 
structure) remain the same. 
Additional literature on illicit nuclear trade networks presented by Braun and 
Chyba expand on the effects of the supply and demand portion of proliferation in terms 
of first and second tier proliferation.98 First-tier proliferation technology are material 
sold/stolen from private companies or when state nuclear programs assist non-nuclear 
weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems.99 
Second-tier nuclear proliferation is when states with developing nuclear capabilities trade 
technical capabilities among themselves to bolster one another’s nuclear and strategic 
weapons efforts.100  
The early days of the A.Q. Khan network serves as an illustrative example of 
first-tier proliferation. Khan used his employment in the Dutch engineering company 
URENCO to gain unauthorized access to nuclear blueprints. In turn, Khan used his 
acquired knowledge to serve as the launch-pad for Pakistan’s nuclear program, and later 
his own nuclear proliferation organization. In an egregious example of post NPT, second-
tier proliferation, China jump-started the Pakistani nuclear program, supplying essential 
nuclear components and materials that included:  
[A] complete design of one of its early uranium nuclear war-heads, 
sufficient quantities of HEU for two weapons, short-range ballistic 
missiles and construction blueprints, assistance in developing a medium-
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centrifuges, including the provision of 5,000 ring magnets, and a 40 
MW(th) heavy-water plutonium and tritium production reactor located at 
Khusab.101 
Second-tier proliferation is projected to grow more popular amongst developing 
countries because they are able to leverage their relaxed import/export control laws and 
manufacturing and machining capabilities, to exchange with one another for nuclear 
materials or components that they are unable to produce.102 Additionally, second tier 
proliferation is attributed to the inability of non-proliferation efforts to control the 
diffusion of nuclear information. Although second-tier proliferation is not a new concept, 
the extensive diffusion of the technological know-how, largely as a result of the Khan 
Organization, and the rapid growth in international trade, have made second tier 
proliferation increasingly more likely to persist.103  Developing countries with 
uncontrolled markets are ripe for continued and future illicit proliferation endeavors. 
However, it is imperative to understand that first and second tier proliferators will 
continuously adapt their network structures to realize their goals.   
Proliferation networks are shaped by their function and are highly responsive to 
outside influencers (i.e., import/export control measures, law enforcement, diplomatic 
demarches, international control lists, sanctions, and intelligence collection efforts)104 If 
the current trend of inter-state procurement of nuclear materials/expertise persists, it can 
be inferred that opportunity exists to further characterize maligned nuclear procurement 
organizations based on their dependency on outside resources.105 Although A.Q. Khan, 
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contributed widely to the availability of nuclear knowledge, the only states that appear to 
be self-sufficient, and do not have the necessity to augment their nuclear ability abroad 
are the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia.106 
E. ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROLIFERATORS 
In the same way that legitimate enterprises strive for maximum optimization of 
resources, proliferation networks seem to maximize profits, minimize risk, and provide a 
product that meets the consumer’s expectation to drive future business. In that light, this 
portion of the research will examine six characteristics of an illicit nuclear procurement 
organization in order to codify their inherent strengths and weaknesses. The 
characteristics to be examined are: Leadership, Motivations, Nature of Operations, 
Associates, Specialization, and Financing (see Table 1). The end state is to shed 
additional light on the nature of the nuclear procurement world.  
Table 1.   Comparative Table of the Characteristics for Terrorist and Proliferation 
Networks 
Organizational Characteristics 
 Terrorist Proliferation 
Leadership Decentralized/Centralized Decentralized/Centralized 
Motivations Ideological/Narrative Based/ 
Financing only a means to an 
end 
Monetary 
Nature of Ops Violent Non-Violent (Adamantly opposed) 
Associates Kinship/Close Ties Witting/Unwitting Participants 
Specialization Innovative/Latency Business Oriented/Technical abilities/
Dual-Use Technologies 
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1. Leadership 
In terms of leadership, nuclear procurement networks can be centralized and 
decentralized.107 The A.Q. Khan network serves as an illustrative example of a 
centralized leadership structure, however, when we examine leadership from the lens of 
second tier-proliferators, the leadership structure has the potential to be more 
decentralized and uncertain. Solely targeting the chief individual, or central node are not 
always effective at dismantling hub and spoke proliferation networks.108 As Gruselle 
notes, successful proliferation organizations maintain informal relations along the formal 
channels to provide redundancy, resulting in a more resilient organization that is not 
largely affected by the removal of an individual.109 Fully understanding the complete 
mechanics and personalities of this type of organization is imperative if this type of 
network is going to be targeted.  
When considering second tier proliferation, the structure can be star-like or ring-
like, as the participants trade nuclear weapons components and missile technology with 
other state actors to augment their shortcomings. It is possible there is not an identifiable 
leader because they are dealing more on a quid-pro-quo basis in which each party has 
something to gain. An example is the situation in which the DPRK turned to Pakistan for 
nuclear technology. This request coincided with the successful DPRK test of the Ghuari 1 
missile, and resulted in an agreement to exchange missiles for enrichment capabilities 
between the two states.110 When dealing with second tier proliferators, they are likely to 
be state actors and will not have a participant that is “in charge.” 
2. Motivations 
Motivations of an organization are helpful tools that aid in further characterizing 
the nature of an organization and predicting future behavior. Generally, identifying a 
                                                 
107 Montgomery, “Ringing In Proliferation,” 4–5; Gruselle, “Proliferation Networks and Financing,” 
13. 
108 Montgomery, “Ringing in Proliferation,” 5. 
109 Gruselle, “Proliferation Networks and Financing,” 13. 
110 Braun and Chyba, “Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Regime,” 5–49. 
 38 
motivation of an individual/group of people is difficult unless it is explicitly stated; 
however, as a matter of observation, proliferation networks primarily operate like any 
other business enterprise with revenue as a staple of its existence. Although A.Q. Khan’s 
motivation to proliferate may have begun for the development of his home country, it 
also appears as though he was an opportunist.111 He found a niche market in which he led 
Pakistan to their acquisition of the bomb, but saw a very lucrative opportunity for himself 
and some of the colleagues he acquired over the years. The high involvement of 
legitimate businesses among illegal transactions necessitate that the network remains a 
lucrative venture. It can be inferred that intermediaries, front companies and financial 
institutions will not take on risk that is not commensurate with satisfactory compensation. 
Second-tier proliferation, in terms of financial gain, appears to be slightly more 
dependent on the situation, as was the case with the trade deal between DPRK and 
Pakistan. Pakistan did not have the currency to acquire the missile technology it was 
seeking, but it did have the nuclear technology to barter with. Perhaps potential for 
further insight within second-tier proliferators could involve determining those countries 
seeking a nuclear solution who do not have the capital to do so. 
3. Nature of Operations 
Nuclear proliferation networks do not typically use high levels of violence as a 
means of operation. Khan’s network was international and operated within the confines 
of import/export controls and common business practices. A non-violent approach is 
paramount for proliferation networks to remain inconspicuous as the illegal freight 
transits multiple ports and authorities. Violence would do nothing more than draw 
additional scrutiny onto a web interwoven with forged paperwork, bribed businessmen, 
intermediaries, corroborating banks, and false companies. Proliferators tend to be loosely 
associated businessmen who shrink from violence and do not adhere to religious or 
criminal codes of conduct.  
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When considering second-tier proliferation, violence against co-conspirators 
could be disastrous, specifically if a particular country owns a niche market. The 
likelihood of violence against a conspiring state could result in the loss of secrecy and 
credit among malevolent actors. This characteristic differs drastically from conventional 
terrorist networks who rely on terror as a means to induce cooperation.  
4. Associates 
Proliferation networks are comprised of both witting and unwitting participants. 
A.Q. Khan employed colleagues that he developed business ties with throughout his 
career at URENCO as witting participants in his operations. Likely there were additional 
unwitting parts companies, shipment companies, and others that were used throughout 
the operation as well. This can be deduced through the extensive efforts to falsify end-
user certificates and other shipping information.  
Second-tier proliferators associate with one-another, but may pose an unforeseen 
risk as they are less hindered by red-tape because the exchanges are state to state. They 
likely have unwitting participants within the networks, to maintain secrecy and it can be 
assumed there are far fewer witting participants. 
5. Specialization 
Proliferation networks are distinct in that their financial status and legitimate 
business connections allow them to operate with the very latest in technology as well as 
exploit the seams that dual use commodities (or commodities that have civilian and 
military application) provide. Libya’s attempt at a nuclear arsenal was a hundred-million-
dollar venture alone,112 and as such, the technology applied to false documents, 
certificates, trans-shipment sites, tracking mechanisms and shipping containers and 
vessels are in place to ensure the product meets the end-user. Proliferation networks’ 
familiarity with import/export regulations allows them “to navigate through the 
                                                 
112 Braun and Chyba, “Proliferation Rings:  New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime,” 40. 
 40 
international gray market that exists between licit and illicit enterprise, and often blurs 
the lines between.”113 
Among the emergence of second-tier proliferation, technology will continue to 
play a pivotal role in proliferation activities to minimize unwanted international 
knowledge of illicit nuclear activities that could result in sanctions or worse. 
6. Financing 
A.Q. Khan’s organization was financed by operating within legitimate businesses, 
front companies, and financial institutions. The potentially high volume of cash flow and 
money transfers produced by a proliferation network are substantial and require 
diversifying funds into multiple banks and financial institutions. The A.Q. Khan network, 
from what has been released appears to have conducted transfers between suppliers and 
front companies and contracts executed through letters of credit114 or bills of 
exchange.115 Other methods indicate bulk cash over several payments that ostensibly, 
were then deposited into off-shore accounts.116 
Second-tier proliferators, could engage in much of the same financial hop-scotch 
to mask origins, but are also unique in that, transactions do not have to be of the financial 
nature. In an instance there is no “money trail” it may not be inconceivable another 
commodity is being bartered. In a proliferation network, the bottom line, is that no one 
does “something for nothing!”  
F.   CONCLUSION 
Over the course of this chapter, we reviewed the fundamental nature of 
proliferation networks and their characteristics. Quite often the characteristics of 
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proliferation networks include illicit transactions under the guise of legitimate business 
and involve the following things:  
– Measures to circumvent export controls 
– Generally low levels of violence  
– Utilizing front companies 
– Maintaining quasi-governmental affiliation 
– Utilizing mainly licit, but also illicit means of smuggling materials  
– Arrangements for the sole purpose of profit117   
Proliferators, like most criminal networks, exhibit the “…capacity …to conceal their 
activities within a variety of licit transactions, to act rapidly in order to exploit new 
opportunities, and to reconfigure and reconstitute organizational structures in response to 
law enforcement successes.”118 Proliferation networks are businesses that adapt their 
practices to remain successful.  
The chapter has also illustrated that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and 
materials routinely occurs in a non-kinetic environment, and as such, military authorities 
such as Title 10 under the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations are rarely central to CP 
operations.119 CP requires the application of multiple assets and agencies to gather 
intelligence, discern suspicious dual-use technologies, understand international export 
control measures, conduct diplomacy, engage law enforcement, direct financial 
intervention, and ultimately disrupt illicit activity that is strikingly similar to legitimate 
business operations. Our research has shown that nuclear proliferation networks will 
likely continue to evolve and persist as technology and the global business landscape 
creates new opportunities. The North Korea-Pakistan example serves as an indicator that 
second-tier proliferation is a trend likely to persist. 
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However, while advances in technology may seem to favor proliferation networks, they 
are in fact opportunities for CP lines of efforts. The fact that proliferation networks 
operate by using legitimate business practices means that there is room for harnessing 
crowdsourcing technologies to target them. While terrorist organizations prefer to operate 
more covertly, proliferation networks, especially second tier proliferators, must operate in 
commercial areas that are exposed to open-source intelligence. From creation to 
distribution, nuclear proliferation is visible to commercial imagery and dedicated online 
searches of unclassified, import/export requests. 
The key take-away from this chapter is that throughout the execution of their 
illicit business, proliferation networks will expose themselves at multiple times to open-
source techniques that can monitor and assess their actions. Furthermore, their attempts at 
acquiring dual-use technologies that aid their efforts to circumvent trade controls presents 
opportunities for incorporating the collective wisdom of many. Indeed, considering the 
number of devices that are remotely-connected exceeding the global population and the 
increasing usage of smartphone technology, there are incredibly new ways for harnessing 
instantaneous, real-time information from concerned citizens around the world.120   
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IV. CASE STUDIES IN CROWDSOURCED GEOSPATIAL DATA 
A changing set of counter-nuclear proliferation problems requires a 
 paradigm shift in monitoring that should include big data analytics  
and crowdsourcing  
—Defense Science Board121 
 
Our research will now shift toward case studies of different types of CGD 
applications. Some of the ones that are discussed are applications that are in common use 
to this day and others are examples of exercises that demonstrate the capacity of time-
critical social mobilization to find answers to geo-locational problems. The flow of this 
chapter will begin with an application that has found ways to harness government 
geospatial data and local reporting to produce aggregated results that influence our lives. 
After this we will review crowd-sourcing applications that explore reporting in denied 
environments and another where simple CGD technology was used by concerned 
individuals to produce the location of a likely North Korean missile-launch site. These 
case studies should provide an idea of how the collective analysis of commercial imagery 
and use social networks for geo-locational problems can be harnessed towards aiding 
USSOCOM’s efforts at unraveling where proliferation networks are currently operating. 
A. CGD FOR REPORTING  
The rapid growth of the internet and the widespread distribution of smartphones across 
the globe has made reporting one of the most viable options for CGD applications. 
Smartphones, specifically, provide individuals with a readily accessible tool for 
identifying and documenting real-time events as they are unfolding. Whether it’s through 
pictures, videos, or audio, transmissions through these devices provide CGD applications 
easy collaboration tools for reporting information. Just prior to the debut of smartphones 
as the ascendant version of cellphones, Goodchild published a paper called “Citizens as 
Sensors: The World of Volunteered Geography,” where he laid out his vision for average 
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individuals to become sensors of the world.122 The development and mass dissemination 
of the smartphone in today’s era made Goodchild’s prediction a reality.       
Currently, many of the most common uses of CGD applications for reporting are 
in regards to events in the daily lives of individuals, such as vehicular traffic, government 
elections, or local weather feedback. However, these applications have also crossed over 
into areas that do not necessarily impact the lives of immediate users, but nonetheless 
build significant followings, such as natural disasters or human rights abuses in war-torn 
countries. Examples of these types of crowdsourced reporting applications include the 
dissemination of traffic information that can then be manipulated through algorithms to 
provide better routes for users in Waze,123 or the real-time reporting of human-rights 
abuses from the current Syrian Civil War in Syria Tracker.124 
There are key attributes to not from each of these CGD tools that should be taken 
into context while reviewing each one. First, Waze exemplifies a hybrid model where 
government map data is amplified with local user information. In this model the users 
play an equal role in the creation of information as the developer of the application does. 
The combination of the two sources makes it an arguably powerful competitor in the 
world of navigation aids. The second example, Syria Tracker, is a prime example of a 
CGD application that uses an open-source software and is actively built around user 
contributions that can then aid government and non-government agencies in their analysis 
of the Syrian Civil War. In this application information is completely built and distributed 
by the users and it is the developer that benefits from their input. These distinctions are 
important for understanding the two methods by which CGD reporting is processed.  
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1. Waze 
With over 50 million users, Waze is one of the largest community-based traffic 
reporting and navigation tools.125 The ability of the program to rapidly synthesize active 
and passive real-time inputs from drivers with algorithms that are then interfaced with 
map data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s TIGER126 database has made it a highly 
successful crowdsourced application.127 Since its debut in 2008, the program has been 
fully developed in 12 other countries and was even used by Rio de Janeiro’s city planners 
prior to the beginning of the 2016 Summer Olympics to manage traffic congestion.128  
The cost of the application is completely free to the user, but it does require that a 
smartphone have its GPS technology turned on in order to be used. While the user does 
not need to actively report any real-time traffic or road conditions, information such as 
travel speeds and location are passively collected from their phone by the program (see 
Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  User Interface for Waze Application 
Source: “Waze Navigation App Now Reads Destination from iOS and Android Calendars,” last 
modified February 20, 2014, https://www.engadget.com/2014/02/20/waze-update-calendar-
integration/. 
How does this platform recruit and retain individuals? The appeal to users is that 
the program has no cost associated to it other than the requirement that a smartphones 
GPS technology be turned on for the program to work. Users are incentivized to 
participate through two methods. The first, is that users who participate and then recruit 
others to participate are immediately rewarded with increasingly higher levels of 
aggregated traffic information that benefits from maximum user participation. In addition 
to having the best routes provided, users are also made aware of potholes, traffic jams, 
and even the presence of police speed traps. The second incentive is a points system that 
is supplied based on the amount of active participation a user provides and then used to 
regionally build hierarchical points based lists so that other Waze users know who has the 
most. 
What contributions can these individuals make to the platform? In addition to the 
passive and active contributions that users can make directly on the mobile application 
platform of Waze, users can also go to the Waze website and directly edit and update the 
map databases. According to Waze there are approximately 100,000 users that perform 
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this function with some reportedly spending hours each day constantly making 
adjustments to the maps.129 
How does this platform use crowdsourcing to solve the target problem? 
According to Waze, around 20 to 100 accurately reported trips are enough to trigger 
automatic updates to the program.130  A significant aspect of the program though is the 
passive collection of the millions of users who travel along the same routes daily. This 
builds into a predictive model for the program which it then aggregates with the active 
input of drivers to account for real-time events that cannot be predicted for, such as slow 
moving commercial trucks or accidents.  
How does this platform evaluate user contributions and address false-identity 
attacks? In the same way that Waze uses the active input of Waze users to develop 
trafficking solutions, it also uses Waze users to evaluate and verify the information that is 
provided to the program. While this arguably leaves the program susceptible to false 
inputs, the ease with which other users can quickly update and validate information 
means that this information can be quickly deleted. More importantly though, since the 
heart of the program is the predictive modeling that is based on the passive collection of 
repetitive traffic routes, any attempt to redirect traffic for malicious purposes would 
require the participation of a significant number of the Waze users.    
2. Syria Tracker 
When the Syrian Civil War first began in early 2011 there was relatively minor 
reporting on events as they were unfolding. Once the Syrian government barred the entry 
of international journalists, reporting on incidents in the country became increasingly 
more difficult.131  In an effort to track the development of the escalating humanitarian 
crisis that was unfolding, Taha Kass-Hout, a social data scientist and Hend Alhinnawi, an 
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international development professional, launched Syria Tracker.132  Built on the Ushahidi 
platform,133 Syria Tracker was envisioned as a way for these two men to use 
crowdsourcing to provide a visual overlay of real-time events (see Figure 6). According 
to Will Haydon’s news report on the program in March of 2015, “Syria Tracker 
synthesizes two pre-existing data-sourcing platforms: Harvard University’s Healthmap, 
which mines online sources to monitor disease outbreaks; and the crowdsourcing tool 
Ushahidi, originally built in 2007 to monitor post-election violence in Kenya.”134 
Figure 6.  Syria Tracker Map Overlay of Reports 
 
Source: “Map Printing,” Syria Tracker, n.d., https://syriatracker.crowdmap.com/printmap. 
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How does this platform recruit and retain individuals? Once Syria Tracker was 
conceived, its designers recognized that receiving credible and reliable reporting from 
individuals in the war-torn country would be difficult. The process of reaching out to 
victims began via word of mouth references and recommendations from trusted 
organizations and individuals in the country. While this method was slow at first, the site 
has now logged “over 100,000 eyewitness reports, mined over 300,000 news articles and 
over 200 million tweets.”135  Much of their success lay in Syria Tracker’s ability to 
combine the wide-spread attention that Twitter feeds produce with the legitimacy of a 
conventional website that brings further trust and veracity to an organization, thus 
strengthening an altruism based community response to a problem.   
What contributions can these individuals make to the platform? Victims are asked 
to submit their reports, videos or photos to Syria Tracker’s Twitter site or to email Syria 
Tracker directly. The analytical aspects of the contributions are conducted by 
Humanitarian Tracker, the sponsoring program manager of Syria Tracker.   
How does this platform use crowdsourcing to solve the target problem? The 
overwhelming support and responses provided to Syria Tracker over the last five years 
has largely been motivated by victims within the country who are seeking ways to bring 
greater international attention and scrutiny to the current civil war. While it would be 
extremely presumptuous to argue that Syria Tracker has played a significant role in 
heightening international attention of the war, it can be argued that Syria Tracker is 
producing the formative stages for an area of crowdsourcing that may become the future 
of reporting in denied areas. In a 2011 study from Internews Center for Innovation & 
Learning, it was determined that fewer than one third of contributors to a crowdsourcing 
project such as Syria Tracker produced results that would be delivered to policy-
makers.136  However, this study also concluded that crowdsourcing for reporting is 
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continuing to gain traction in the online world and may yet become a powerful tool for 
the political and policy process.137 
How does this platform evaluate user contributions and address false-identity 
attacks??  One of the more difficult, as well as critical, aspects of crowd-sourced 
reporting in a denied area is assessing the veracity and legitimacy of the information that 
is being reported. When interviewed about this Kass-Hout stated, “out of the 600-plus 
reporters [who have posted] over the past few years, we consider about a dozen of those 
to be credible.”  He further stated that only 5,000 of the more than 80,000 reports were 
ever published as a part of their findings.138  This seems to indicate that while 
crowdsourcing can produce considerable results, some level of moderating still has to 
exist to bring legitimacy to the program.      
B. CGD FOR SEARCHING 
Coordinating the efforts of multiple individuals across a distributed geographical 
area is a challenging and perplexing dilemma.139 However, research has shown that there 
is potential for social media to be leveraged towards galvanizing individuals to participate 
and contribute in a concerted effort towards search operations using CGD maps.140  In an 
article written about the power of using open-source communities for search operations, 
Dorothy Denning stated that these systems offered, “the opportunity to magnify the 
mobilization of persons and resources, data collection and dissemination, and verification 
of acquired data.”141  The advantages of these tools are that they provide almost 
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instantaneous feedback (including user requests and reports), provide unparalleled 
opportunities for aggregating data from a wide variety of communication mediums 
(emails, tweets, etc.), and they allow geo-locational data to be received from user 
submissions.142  These capabilities make CGD searching operations a potentially 
powerful tool of analysis.      
Shortly after the January 27, 2007 disappearance of a computer scientist named 
Jim Gray, who was sailing alone along the Northern California coast, close associates and 
long-time friends of his in the scientific and computer-software industries began 
developing one of the first crowd-sourced search projects. Despite the considerable time 
and resources that were dedicated to the project by the volunteers, Jim Gray and his 
vessel were never found. However, their volunteer search operation was not done in vain 
as it explored a path for crowdsourcing that has since grown into a viable method for 
augmenting traditional search operation methods that rely heavily on the physical 
presence of individuals to locate a particular individual or object of interest.143  
When Gray’s close associates became involved in efforts to locate him out at sea 
they brought with themselves a multitude of experience in drift-modeling, computer 
software development, and access to commercial satellite imagery courtesy of 
DigitalGlobe.144  Their use of crowdsourcing to aid in Gray’s recovery efforts laid the 
framework for the use of CGD during disaster relief operations. Follow-up deployments 
of CGD tools during disasters in Kenya, Mexico, Afghanistan, and Haiti, highlighted the 
benefits of using the Ushahidi program for open source crisis map platforms.145  The 
relatively well-known functions of the Ushahidi platform make it an excellent mechanism 
for social activism and collective contributions of information. This enabled governments 
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and non-government agencies to more effectively operate alongside one another through 
a visualization tool that mapped incidents and responses.  
The driving incentive behind getting users to participate in CGD crisis mapping 
during disasters is altruism. However, there are times when altruistic incentives cannot be 
used by a CGD application for search operations. In the following case studies, we 
branch away from the use of CGD for crisis map platforms and review how DARPA 
setup an exercise to explore how the online community could be used to find ten red 
balloons across the continental United States. We then look at how the Department of 
State (DoS) expanded on this case study by asking the online community to find the 
location of five individuals across two continents. In both exercises we seek to 
extrapolate how internet users were incentivized to participate in a CGD search operation 
where the tangible benefits were not rooted strictly in altruism.  
1. Red Balloon Challenge 
On December 5, 2009, DARPA issued a social networking mobilization challenge 
that has come to be known as, the Red Balloon Challenge. Teams were asked to “identify 
distributed mobilization strategies and demonstrate how quickly a challenging 
geolocation problem could be solved by crowdsourcing.”146  Ten red balloons were 
floated across the United States and each team was asked to identify and report the 
location of each for a grand prize of $40,000 (see Figure 7). Remarkably, a team from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Media Lab reported the correct locations 
of all the balloons in less than nine hours.147  By the end of the exercise DARPA reported 
that over 4,000 teams across 39 countries participated in their exercise. Based on follow-
up interviews and their estimates of network size, DARPA believes that more than 
350,000 people participated in their exercise.148 
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While most of the teams used some method of social media outreach, it was 
arguably the extrinsic financial incentives that Media Lab created that made their team 
ultimately successful.149  However, their success was not simply marked by an 
unprecedented recruitment scheme, but also by a clearly laid plan that combined 
common-sense geo-locational information with direct verification to ensure that the 
information that their team received was legitimate.150  In the following analysis we 
explore the winning formula that Media Lab employed in order to extract pertinent 
information for using crowd-sourcing tools for time-constrained social mobilization.   
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Figure 7.  Red Balloon Locations during DARPA Challenge 
 
Source: Map. PNG Image, 819 x 480 pixels, n.d., http://archive.darpa.mil/networkchallenge/
BalloonMap.html. 
 
How does this platform recruit and retain individuals? Clearly distinct 
recruitment strategies were employed by each of the top-ranked teams in the challenge 
and reflected the varying strengths of each team’s initial capabilities and the value of 
their later approaches at recruitment. Media Lab, the winning team, employed a variation 
of Kleinberg and Raghavan’s Query Incentive Network strategy for the recruitment and 
retention of participants for their team that they referred to as the recursive incentive-
structure.151 However, instead of using a fixed payment system for monetary rewards, 
they issued a split contract payment. This meant that the Media Lab’s reward system 
would scale with the size of the recruitment tree and not be fixed towards benefitting only 
those that are immediately connected to the individuals that helped find the red balloons.   
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For their model this meant that the individual who reported the correct location of 
the balloon received $2,000, that the person that had recruited that person received 
$1,000, the recruiter of this person then received a reward of $500, and so on (see  
Figure 8).152  This system was based on dividing the $40,000 prize into ten pots for each 
of the red balloons so that $4,000 was available for the tree of each successfully reported 
balloon. By dividing this pot in half, Media Lab created a nearly limitless pool of 
financial incentives. However, since we can hypothesize from Milgram’s Small World 
Phenomenon that nearly everyone in the world is only separated by no more than six 
degrees, the smallest amount paid out would most likely never be lower than $125.        
Figure 8.   Recursive Incentive Structure for Red Balloon Challenge 
 
Source: Tang et al., “Reflecting on the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge,” 81. 
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The performance of the recursive incentive-structure in this exercise reflected 
three important properties that should be considered for future crowdsourcing 
applications. First, the scalable incentive model ensures that rewards can be provided 
without exceeding the budget of the program. Once an individual is recruited to 
participate in locating a balloon, they have no financial incentive to create their own 
network of individuals and are instead incentivized to continue helping the tree of nodes 
that they are already operating within. Second, this model provides incentives for 
individuals to not only participate in the crowdsourcing application, but also recruit other 
individuals towards their cause.   
Finally, in a time-critical situation, this model for financial incentives maintains 
the attention and participation of its users for a longer period of time than other strategies. 
For example, the model employed by George Hotz, a well-known hacker with a huge 
Twitter following, was heavily dependent on his access to tens of thousands of users via 
his Twitter page during the competition. While this gave him a huge advantage during the 
opening hours of the competition (four balloons were found by his followers), the number 
of tweets that he received rapidly declined once Media Lab’s financial incentives were 
more widely distributed across the web.153  This reinforces the notion that some form of 
financial incentive must be provided to maintain interest in the competition if there is no 
personally vested reason for person to participate in the program. An altruism-based 
strategy for crowdsourced applications may be feasible for programs like Syria Tracker, 
but they’re not sustainable for something that does not arouse emotions, like finding red 
balloons or scouring the internet for traces of an unidentifiable nuclear proliferation ring. 
What contributions can these individuals make to the platform? During this 
competition, users were asked to either play a role in recruiting individuals who would be 
able to help find the red balloon, or to report the location of the red-balloon. In order to 
successfully report the location of a balloon, individuals were asked to submit a picture of 
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the red balloon and to report the exact location of the balloons using street addresses, 
crossroads, or landmarks.154 
How does this platform use crowdsourcing to solve the target problem? For this 
crowdsourced problem set, Media Lab did not employ any remarkable method for 
compiling the information that they received other than by asking that users go through 
their website for the recruitment of individuals and balloon reporting. During this 
exercise, Media Lab created a website on the MIT server and then had each of the teams 
that were helping theirs distribute links to this site via email, direct messaging, etc.155  
For example, if Jon wanted to recruit his friend Ed to help he would send him a link to 
http://balloon.mit.edu/jon. This provided Media Lab with an easy way of managing user 
submissions and analyzing the flow of information distribution. 
How does this platform evaluate user contributions and address false-identity 
attacks? In order to ensure that the information that Media Lab received was authentic, 
they developed a strategy for filtering false information that relied on two critical 
ideas.156  First, balloon sightings that were only reported by one person were ignored. 
During this exercise, Media Lab frequently received balloon sighting reports for the same 
red balloon. The submission of multiple reports on the same balloon in the same location 
meant that there was consistency that could be relied upon and that the balloon’s reported 
location was accurate. Second, user submissions were compared to the reports generated 
internet protocol (IP) address. For example, if a balloon was reported in Florida but the IP 
address stemmed from California then the geo-locational information was deemed false. 
By using this process of elimination the team was able to protect themselves from 
malicious subversion. 
 
                                                 
154 Tang et al., “Reflecting on the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge,” 81. 
155 Tang et al., “Reflecting on the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge,” 80. 
156 Tang et al., “Reflecting on the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge,” 81. 
 58 
2. Tag Challenge 
The DOS raised the bar on using crowdsourced applications for geo-locational 
purposes when they developed the “Tag Challenge.”157  On March 31, 2012, they issued 
the following statement:  
The 2012 Tag Challenge calls on technology enthusiasts from several 
nations to set their sleuthing skills loose on a mock gang of jewel thieves 
in an international search contest to take place Saturday, March 31. 
The social gaming contest will have participants use technological and 
social resources to locate and photograph five “suspects” in five different 
cities—Washington, D.C., New York City, London, Stockholm, and 
Bratislava—based only on a picture and a short description of each one. 
The first person to upload pictures of all five suspects to the Tag 
Challenge website will earn international bragging rights—and a cash 
prize of $5,000.158 
Participants in this challenge were given mugshots of the individuals and a quick back 
story on them that gave clues to their location. For example, one of the thieves, Teresa 
Bay, was described as being responsible for counterfeiting Starbucks gift cards. She was 
later identified while sitting at a Starbucks café.159  However, the problem of identifying 
lone individuals in cities with millions of residents persisted and the difficulty of this 
challenge increased significantly from the Red Balloon Challenge because of the ability 
of the thieves to “hide in plain sight.”160  For the purposes of this case study our research 
once again focuses on the winning team, Team CrowdScanner, and the strategy that they 
employed to locate, identify, and report the location of three of the five individuals.161 
                                                 
157 “Challenge website – Tag Challenge,” n.d., http://www.tag-challenge.com/. 
158 “Challenge website – Tag Challenge,” n.d., http://www.tag-challenge.com/. 
 159 Rebecca Boyle, “POPSCI Q&A: How to Track Down International Jewel Theives via Facebook,” 
April 3, 2012, http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-04/popsci-qampa-how-social-networks-
can-succeed-and-fail-solving-international-manhunt. 
 160 Alex Rutherford, Manuel Cebrian, Sohan Dsouza, Esteban Moro, Alex Pentland, and Iyad 
Rahwan, “The Limits of Social Mobilization,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 110, 16 (2013): 6281–6286. 
 161 Iyad Rahwan, Sohan Dsouza, Alex Rutherford, Victor Naroditskiy, James McInerney, Matteo 
Venanzi, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Manuel Cebrian, “Global Manhunt Pushes the Limits of Social 
Mobilization,” IEEE Computer Society, 46, 4 (April 2013): 68–75. 
 59 
How does this platform recruit and retain individuals? Team CrowdScanner was 
composed of many of the former members of MIT’s Media Lab team and as a result used 
many of the same approaches that they had used in 2009 for the recruitment and retention 
of users. The recursive incentive-structure was once again employed in order to 
financially incentivize individuals to not only help find the thieves, but also recruit their 
friends to help them. For this exercise, however, a slight modification to the payouts was 
made as a result of the reduced prize money.162  A prize of $500 was awarded by the 
team to anyone who could upload a picture of one of the thieves, an additional $100 was 
given to the person that referred them to that person, and $1 was provided to recruiters 
for each person that they got to sign up and participate (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9.  Recursive Incentive Structure for Tag Challenge 
 
Source: Rahwan et al., “Global Manhunt Pushes the Limits of Social Mobilization,” 71. 
 
What contributions can these individuals make to the platform? As with the Red 
Balloon Challenge, individuals were asked to not only help in finding the location of the 
thieves, but also play a direct role in recruiting others. A successful identification of a 
                                                 
162 Rahwan et al., “Global Manhunt Pushes the Limits of Social Mobilization,” 70. 
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thief during this competition included their location at time of siting, as well as, a picture 
of their shirt, which the Department of State labeled with key images in order to root out 
any attempt at false identification.163   
How does this platform use crowdsourcing to solve the target problem?  Team 
CrowdScanner once again developed a website for the management of user contributions 
and referrals, but also added a mobile application for this competition.164 Surprisingly, 
many of the participants elected not to use the website or mobile apps during this 
competition when reporting the location of a thief, but instead chose to directly email 
Team CrowdScanner, indicating the value of direction communication when information 
is deemed important enough.165 
How does this platform evaluate user contributions and address false-identity 
attacks? During this exercise, Team CrowdScanner experienced no issues with the 
aggregation and verification of the data that it received. Much of this had to do with the 
coded images that were labeled on the shirts of the thieves, thus making manual 
verification relatively simple. Additionally, the fact that the team only received one 
image from each of the three cities that thieves were successfully found in made 
aggregation of information a non-requirement. However, this is not say that participation 
in the exercise was minimal as Figure 10 shows the global participation that Team 
CrowdScanner reached. 
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Figure 10.  Heat Map Showing the Distribution of Visitors to Team CrowdScanner’s 
Website. 
 
Source: Rahwan et al., “Global Manhunt Pushes the Limits of Social Mobilization,” 71. 
 
C. CGD FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION VALIDATION 
Regardless of the source, once information is collected and aggregated it has to be 
validated somehow in order to ensure authenticity. Within the U.S. Intelligence 
Community this usually takes the form of multiple, reliable human reports and 
corroboration with other forms of collection tools, such as satellite imagery, geographic 
sensors, or signal reports. However, CGD applications are particularly adept at the 
validation of information where multiple views of data can help identify flaws in analysis 
or even help report anomalies.166  Eric Raymond, the author of “The Cathedral and the 
Bazaar,” referred to this as Linus’s Law when he stated that, “given enough eyeballs, all 
bugs are shallow.”167  Towards this end we explore a case study where faculty from CNS 
used crowdsourcing tools to validate the People’s Republic of China’s assertions that 
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they had not provided North Korea with transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles that 
could then be used as mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) platforms.168  
In the last few years, North Korea has increasingly used its nuclear arsenal to 
threaten retaliation and respond to what it has deemed as existential threats to its regime’s 
existence.169  The international community’s growing concern over the willingness of 
North Korea to use these weapons has provided significant incentives to finding 
alternative methods for monitoring and verifying international adherence to the various 
nuclear non-proliferation treaties (e.g., NPT, CTBT, and the proposed Fissile Material 
Cut-Off Treaty).170 Over the last few years, the Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management has explored an area of crowdsourcing that they referred to as outsider 
reporting, an innovative approach that looks to foreigners to use emerging technology, 
such as DigitalGlobe’s free satellite imagery, to help report treaty violators.171  As 
Ronald Mitchell stated,  
Outsiders have stronger incentives to monitor and provide information, 
although they have more limited capacities, since the risk from the suspect 
government is far less. Indeed, most governments would consider any 
effort to retaliate against their citizens for helping to reveal clandestine 
nuclear activity as warranting severe sanctions. Thus, these actors face far 
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less risk of retaliation, assuming they are outside the suspect country at the 
time the information becomes public.172 
As Mitchell points out, this method for crowdsource reporting has significant limitations, 
but a successful application of this idea was in fact realized. 
In April of 2012, Chinese officials reported the sale of highly specialized vehicle 
chassis to North Korea the previous year.173  While these vehicles were sold to North 
Korea with the understanding that they would be used for commercial purposes, they 
were instead repurposed into TEL vehicles. The team from CNS then used free, three-
dimensional computer modeling software from a company called SketchUp174 to 
construct a drawing of the housing structure for this vehicle based on imagery from the 
commercial Chinese company’s website and a YouTube posted North Korean 
propaganda video (see Figure 11).175   
Figure 11.  SketchUp Drawing Developed by CNS. 
 
Source: Lee, Lewis, and Hanham, “Assessing the Potential of Societal Verification by 
Means of New Media,” 17. 
 
Once the team had an idea of what the building might look like they began data 
mining South Korean social media sites for North Korean defector information about the 
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possible location of missile launch sites and discovered that Changang Province was a 
highly likely location.176  At this point they then used Wikimapia, as well as, a North 
Korea Uncovered KMZ file, courtesy of the blog North Korean Economy Watch, to 
ascertain the most likely location of the buildings by searching in the vicinity of North 
Korea’s surface to air missile launch sites.177  In this way they took two different CGD 
tools to create an analysis of an area that in essence created a new CGD map. With this 
information they were able to identify a structure using GoogleMaps178 that was an 
almost identical match to the structure that they created using the SketchUp software (see 
Figure 12). The ability of the team from CNS to use social media analysis and CGD map 
analysis to extrapolate the location of the North Korean TEL is remarkable. It 
underscores how these tools can be successfully leveraged towards real-world threats in a 
denied environment.  
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Figure 12.  GoogleMaps Imagery of Suspected TEL Housing Structure. 
 
Source: Lee, Lewis, and Hanham, “Assessing the Potential of Societal Verification by 
Means of New Media,” 21. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we explored a variety of examples of how CGD has been used to 
solve a problem or create better solutions. CGD applications can vary in terms of how 
user input is synthesized with government data. In the Waze example, the two played 
equal roles in providing a traffic and navigational solution. In the Syria Tracker, it was 
the users that provided all the information with the responsibility of aggregation being the 
purview of the sponsoring non-governmental agency. The Red-Balloon and Tag 
Challenges showcased an example of CGD where commercial imagery analysis played 
an almost insignificant role in location, but user input in the form of social networking 
geo-locational, was critical for the success of this type of CGD. A critical note from these 
two examples was the use of recursive incentive structure to leverage the support of users 
to participate in solving the problem, but also in the recruitment of others to aid in this 
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effort. In the final case study, we reviewed an example of how multiple CGD maps and 
applications were used to ascertain the possible location of a North Korean missile site. 
The scale and breadth by which crowdsourcing can impact the diverse spectrum of 
nuclear proliferation threats constitutes a serious consideration of how they can be 
developed for use by the CP community. CGD tools are pervasive and have already 
become integral parts of our daily lives. While the application of these tools by the U.S. 
Government has been minimal, there are exponential opportunities for how they can be 
used towards real-time reporting, geo-locational searches, and information validation. 
The application of these tools can provide USSOCOM with innovative methods at better 
answering the question of where proliferation networks are operating and may help 
expose how they are operating. We now turn our thesis towards the challenges that CGD 
applications face and make specific recommendations for how USSOCOM can apply 
these techniques.  
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V. ADDRESSING THE SKEPTICS 
On the afternoon of April 15, 2013, two bombs went off near the finish line of the 
Boston Marathon. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation issued an unprecedented call for any and all images that could possibly aid 
in efforts to identify possible suspects.179  By this time, photos and videos of the attack 
were already saturating social media sites, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. On 
one site, Reddit.com,180 users were already coming together to make their own 
conjectures about who the possible suspects were. In an effort to unravel the case on their 
own, they used crowdsourced images and information to create their own individual 
investigations.   
Well before the authorities released any leads, some of these users began offering 
to the public their own conclusions on who the possible suspects were. What ensued was 
an online witch-hunt that devastated the lives of several individuals and their families. 
Two men, labeled as the “backpack brothers,” were barraged on Facebook and had their 
pictures featured on the front page of the New York Post.181 Another man, Sunil Tripathi, 
was erroneously identified as a suspect despite having been missing for almost eight 
weeks.182 His family’s Facebook page, “Help Us Find Sunil Tripathi,” was saturated with 
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hate messages and condemnations. He was later found dead.183  While Reddit users were 
inspired to aid in locating the Boston Marathon Bombing suspects, in the end, their 
spread of misinformation only led to wrongful accusations.   
A. CROWDSOURCED MISINFORMATION 
In the end, it came down to more traditional police work that led authorities to the 
Boston marathon Bombing suspects.184  While the authorities’ lead came from a video 
obtained from the vicinity of the attack, it was not one of the ones that had been uploaded 
to the internet or submitted to authorities by eyewitnesses. This case calls into questions 
the utility of crowdsourcing in time-critical events. Crowdsourced reporting is 
particularly vulnerable to the spread of these types of misinformation, especially in 
denied or war-torn areas. On November 9, 2015, a video link was released on Twitter 
purporting to be documentation of 200 children being executed by Islamic State 
militants.185  The video in question turned out to be approximately one-year-old and had 
in fact been a video depicting Islamic State militants murdering 200 Syrian Assad regime 
soldiers after their base was overrun.186  While no one can effectively argue that the 
Islamic State does not use deplorable tactics, crowdsourcing on the internet led to 
misattribution and the spread of false information. 
To say though, that crowdsourcing information is fundamentally flawed because 
of a lack of expert opinion and that trusted authorities and news media outlets do not 
themselves get things wrong, is false. Government agencies routinely misattribute and 
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make wrongful accusations all the time. On July 27, 1996, Richard Jewell was working 
as a temporary security guard when he noticed an oddly placed green backpack outside of 
where the Atlanta Summer Olympics were being held.187  After he notified authorities 
and assisted in getting pedestrians away from the backpack, a bomb went off, killing one 
and wounding hundreds of bystanders. In the aftermath of the explosion, Jewell went 
from being called a hero by news outlets, to being labeled as the number one suspect by 
authorities and vilified by the media, and then back again as a recognized hero. The 
trusted and vetted authority of national news media and law enforcements agencies were 
soon called into question as Jewell had his life turned upside down and then back again.   
The inherent strengths of crowdsourcing rests in the fact that these applications 
serve as living platforms that are consistently being enhanced by more and more 
feedback. The often criticized reliability of Wikipedia is particularly vulnerable to these 
types of condemnations. However, a cursory glance at the edit pages for the articles on 
Wikipedia reveals a detailed list of amendments, the responsible editors, and when these 
edits were made. It is true that an individual can go on this site and change the date of the 
Pearl Harbor Attack from December 7, 1941 to December 8, 1941. However, these 
changes have to be accepted by other users before they are accepted and are subject to 
quick amendments by concerned historians who do not wish to have these facts falsely 
distributed. Another website, Bellingcat,188 is an example of crowdsourced information 
self-correcting. This site is comprised of individual experts from around the world who 
routinely fact-check and verify the authenticity of images, videos, and reports that surface 
on social media sites. The ability of crowdsourced information to auto-correct itself gives 
itself enough credibility to stand as a complementary tool to traditional forms of 
information gathering and analysis. 
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B. THE LIMITS OF CGD IN DENIED ENVIRONMENTS 
Two of the case studies reviewed dealt with reporting in denied environments.   
While each of them show-cased successful CGD applications in their respective 
situations, fundamental weaknesses in the data obtained must be addressed. The most 
critical factor in recognizing the limits of CGD in denied environments is the incredible 
risks that the use of these applications pose to the citizens that employ them. As Kass-
Hout, one of the founders of Syria Tracker, states, “along the way, we have lost reporters. 
We get reports from them for months and months and then we stop getting reports from 
them.”189  Asking citizens in these denied environments to participate in CGD tools that 
support CP policies in effect makes them vulnerable to accusations that they are spies for 
America. 
The second factor that must be considered is the age of the information that is 
being collected. A significant aspect of the CNS study on finding the potential location of 
the North Korean TEL was the social media blogs that were posted by North Korean 
defectors who were commenting on the location of North Korean air defense sites. The 
use of CGD tools in this case study was predicated on the assumptions gleaned from 
these blog sites. However, since these were North Korean defectors, it calls into question 
how recent the information that they were sharing was. While it seems to have worked 
out for CNS in this case study, the same may assumptions not always hold true. Is 
information truly considered reliable if it is derived from individuals who came from a 
denied environment possibly two years earlier? 
These factors speak to an aspect of CGD employment that USSOCOM must 
consider, that deploying these tools in denied environments should only be regarded as 
part of in-extremis operation. Furthermore, using CGD tools for an emergency search 
operation should be regarded as a final measure when all other methods for proliferation 
monitoring have failed and determining the location of a nuclear device is considered a 
national priority. While it is possible to protect the identities of users in a denied 
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environment by having them use Tor software,190 this program is becoming increasingly 
less adept at protecting user anonymity.191  There are many benefits to using CGD, 
namely being its low-cost and high-impact medium for analyzing geospatial data, but 
using it as a CP tool that harnesses individuals in a hostile, denied environment is only 
recommended in emergency circumstances. 
C. SYBIL ATTACKS ON THE RECURSIVE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE 
One of the benefits of the recursive incentive structure is its efficacy at producing 
recruiters that provide a clear path towards individuals who can produce answers to 
queries. In the Red Balloon and Tag Challenge case studies, the monetary rewards were 
highly effective at incentivizing individuals to participate in the recruitment and querying 
process. However, one of the challenges that were encountered by the Media Lab team 
was the submission of false information from false identities, otherwise known as sybils. 
The Media Lab team was able to effectively navigate around these sybil-attacks by 
closely scrutinizing IP addresses and conducting a comparative analysis of sybil 
submissions with other user-generated submissions. This methodology quickly isolated 
the sybil-attacks and protected the validity of the balloon location submissions. 
However, if USSOCOM proceeds with the development of CGD application that 
leverages the support of internet users in monitoring open-source satellite imagery, the 
scale by which the CGD application will need to protect itself from sybil-attacks will be 
significantly larger. To this end, research is being conducted into the creation of 
algorithms that are variations of the recursive incentive structure and provide arguably 
sybil-proof solutions.192  Many of these algorithms focus on the production of split-
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contract payments that vary themselves depending on the quality of the user submissions, 
as well as, the responsible recruiters. Its argued that this methodology reduces the desire 
of sybil-attacks by de-incentivizing individuals from spending the time to create false 
identities if the payout structure is not large enough to warrant the effort. Even a 
dedicated sybil-attack that relies upon multiple bots to create sybils can be quickly 
isolated and denied access to the CGD application once it is found. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Inevitably there will always be impediments and drawbacks to the deployment of 
CGD applications for CP operations. Whether it is information that is wrongly 
misattributed or a malicious sybil-attacks, some effort will have to be dedicated to 
protecting the integrity of CGD applications at providing reliable feedback that 
complements existing nuclear proliferation monitoring efforts. The unique nature of 
crowdsourcing means that along the process of CGD deployment, this requirement will 
not be the sole responsibility of USSOCOM. Users that are incentivized to participate in 
a CGD application that aids nuclear proliferation monitoring can be just as quickly 
incentivized to find solutions that might threaten these systems. The Ushahidi platform is 
now on its third edition and code lines are constantly being added by users to streamline 
its performance.193  This is indicative of crowdsourced, open software systems and 
speaks to their ability to leverage concerned users towards maintaining their efficacy. 
While there are those who will be skeptical of the performance of CGD tools to 
complement existing nuclear proliferation monitoring efforts, there will also be users 
ready to address their concerns. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Crowd-sourced Geospatial Data is an instrument that has practical application 
toward monitoring efforts in support of counter proliferation operations and policies. 
Although we recognize that CGD is not a “silver-bullet” to address a problem that has 
metastasized over time, we assert that it should be seen as a viable and inexpensive (in 
terms of financial and personnel resources) tool available to those who can creatively 
implement it. We recommend that USSOCOM, and any other governmental agency that 
employs these tools, use the following recommendations from this study. First, deploy a 
CGD application through the Ushahidi application. As one of the first open-source 
software programs capable of aggregating and displaying large amounts of data on to 
geo-spatial imagery, it stands as the most widely recognized and usable application for 
concerned citizens around the world. Second, incentivize individuals to participate in 
CGD by using the recursive incentive structure. In multiple exercises and studies, this 
methodology has repeatedly shown itself to be far superior to other methods in 
galvanizing support for geo-locational purposes. Finally, build the CGD application in 
with other commercial, off the shelf nuclear detection sensors around the world. The 
results of these sensors could be displayed using the Ushahidi platform with users being 
given the ability to comment on results and make recommendations.  
A. USE THE USHAHIDI PLATFORM 
Since its inception in 2008, the Ushahidi platform has been deployed by 
organizations around the world, including the United Nations, British Broadcasting 
Channel, the World Bank, and the Red Cross. The strength of the program lies in its 
ability to quickly receive data through multiple mediums, such as twitter feeds, emails, 
instant messages, etc., while simultaneously allowing the creator of the map to manage 
and triage reports. This provides an unparalleled capability for filtering data and building 
multiple map layers and configurable charts that provide easy to read display results. 
These features are significantly more developed then similar CGD programs, such as 
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LiveUAMap.194  By deploying a tool through Ushahidi, USSOCOM would be working 
off a capability that has been thoroughly vetted and trusted by agencies and individuals 
from around the world. Furthermore, the continuous updates to the Ushahidi program has 
made the software much more durable against crashes and the crowdsourced nature of its 
current version makes fixes less of a concern for USSOCOM. 
B. USE THE RECURSIVE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE 
In the Red Balloon and Tag Challenge case studies the recursive incentive 
structure was found to be far superior at galvanizing individuals than any other incentive 
structure. While other teams in these competitions attempted to rely upon heavily built 
social media followings or altruism based incentive structures, the winning team from 
these two competitions showed the power that small amounts of well-placed money have 
in getting internet users involved in simulated geo-locational exercises. For this incentive 
structure to be fully realized, USSOCOM would need to build a website that allows it to 
manage user submissions and user references. It would then need to tie this website in 
with its Ushahidi software so that users can see the fruits of their labor. By deploying 
these two together, USSOCOM can potentially get individuals from the world involved 
in the tedious task of nuclear proliferation monitoring. 
C. BUILD CGD INTO OTHER SENSORS 
A DARPA initiative utilizing a crowd-sourced radiation sensor showed 
considerable promise for further applications of CGD to augment CP monitoring efforts. 
At a demonstration of the devices in September of 2015, the sensor transmitted a signal 
through a paired cell phone that was sending the data to a server that was recording the 
readings from the sensor and all the other sensors in use at the conference.195 The data 
that was received was aggregated in a government cloud bank for analysis. This 
information was then used to produce a heat map of the radiation levels at the event. The 
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demonstration of the relatively cheap DARPA device, working in concert with mobile-
connected devices, show potential for strategic placement of sensors around the globe to 
corroborate nuclear inclinations. However, since these sensors are being created using 
commercial, off the shelf technology and being first deployed around the U.S. to first 
responders (i.e., police officers, EMT personnel), there is a huge potential for synching 
this technology with a CGD application. 
Our recommendation to USSOCOM would be to tie CGD tools into sensor 
programs similar to the one now being deployed by DARPA. Rather than sending the 
information collected by the sensors to a government cloud for analysis, we recommend 
that the sensors report to the government cloud, as well as, a server that can then feed the 
information into a Ushahidi crisis map. This would be a hybrid solution similar to the one 
created in the Waze case study, where public and private interests converge to form a 
better product. By relaying the data this way it allows for outside analysis to aid in 
focused monitoring efforts. Furthermore, by employing the recursive incentive structure 
alongside the CGD tool and nuclear detection sensors, USSOCOM can encourage a 
wider array of participation (see Figure 13).  
Figure 13.  Overlay of Proposed Sensor Network with the Ushahidi Platform. 
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Another possible contemporary application of CGD, with a recursive incentive 
structure, lies in targeting the emerging second-tier proliferation networks efforts to 
acquire nuclear components and materials abroad. The need for outsourcing materials 
provides an opportunity to partner with logistics companies and offer monetary 
incentives for reporting “irregular” shipments. This method of monitoring has the 
potential to limit the needle in a haystack approach to import/export control lists that 
consume multiple hours of customs agents time. Additionally, it plays to the weakness of 
a proliferation network that is primarily motivated by money. Moreover, an incentive 
based approach which rewards the location of illicit shipments as well as recruiting 
additional businesses to contribute to the efforts, can cause considerable logistics 
concerns to proliferators. Overlaying the Ushahidi based CGD would also allow an on-
line open source profile of these questionable shipments that can be monitored and edited 
as the chameleon-like nuclear smuggling networks adapt.  
Of particular interest to USSOCOM are the potential avenues available through 
our partnerships with foreign militaries and police units. The dispersal of similar devices 
can aid on-going proliferation partnerships, training and future operations. Due to the 
classified nature of military CP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP), much of the 
knowledge concerning proliferation is not something that is shared liberally with foreign 
partners. As such, the DARPA sensor model is a tool for CP that can be considered for 
implementation within foreign units responsible for WMD response, but lack the 
technical monitor/search capability. The sensors mentioned are not classified (an 
assumption made from the publication in a journal) and the information would be routed 
through Ushahidi, allowing the partner nation to have uninhibited access and editorial 
rights to the data collected. This type of real-time incident population to Ushahidi could 
lead to more timely notification for US/allied forces awareness as well as a shorter 
response time to a crisis.  
CGD tools are pervasive and have already become integral parts of our daily 
lives. There are on-going crowd-sourcing initiatives of commercial map imagery as a 
monitoring option, but this type of CGD is more applicable to monitoring for treaty and 
agreement infringements. The scale and breadth by which crowdsourcing can impact the 
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diverse spectrum of nuclear proliferation threats constitutes a serious consideration of 
how they can be developed for use by the CP community. The herculean task the IA and 
DOD shoulder in support of CP and security is noteworthy. By using CGD, USSOCOM 
is investing in a low-cost, high-impact tool that may potentially have huge benefits in 
amplifying existing efforts aimed at preventing the illegal acquisition of nuclear material, 
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